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ABSTRACT 
From Choosing to Responsibility - The Impact of the Sense of Control on Memory 
Ljubica Chatman 
The perceived exercise of volitional control results in better recall, beyond the effects of 
preference and attention to the task. Greater perceived control resulted in increased 
memory both in explicit learning (Studies one, two, and three) and implicit learning (four 
and five). In Studies one through three we used word list materials and allowed 
participants either an illusion of choice, forced choice or no choice during learning. Study 
1 showed that perceived choice resulted in greater memory compared to forced choice. 
Study 2 showed that compared to no choice baseline, forced choice resulted in decreased 
cued recall performance, while the choice condition was marginally greater. In Study 3 
we replicated this effect, and with better statistical power found that choice produced 
significantly greater recall than control, and forced choice produced significantly 
diminished recall. Studies four and five employed a novel implicit memory paradigm, 
leading participants to believe that their actions had caused an outcome either before the 
action, after the action occurred, after the ostensible outcome, or no causality (Study 4), 
caused by either oneself or another student (Study 5). Memory for the “outcome” was 
greater when the perception of causality was induced before the outcome compared to 
both after outcome and no causality for both self and other as causal agents. Moreover, 
greater perceived causal involvement of either self or other increased the emotional 
response to the negative outcome. Our results are best understood in terms of increased 
motivational relevance, leading to greater accessibility and salience of events caused by 
an intentional agent.
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Introduction – the role of agency in learning 
 
 
In a small village school in Matamoros, Mexico, a teacher employed a new method in his 
classroom. Instead of continuing with the tried and true lessons that bored both him and 
the children, teacher Sergio Juárez Correa asked his students: “So, what do you want to 
learn?” (Davis, 2013), letting the students find information online and solve problems 
themselves. He told the students that although they may not be doing so well at the 
moment, they have much potential. He relinquished the strict control of the classroom in 
order to allow students to explore what they wanted to know for themselves and merely 
served as a facilitator and guide in their search for answers from the available sources 
Internet access and available books.  
 The following year the students took a standardized test, viewing it as an 
impediment to the way that they were now accustomed to learning, as they had not 
prepared for the test directly. When the results came in, they showed a dramatic 
improvement in the average scores in math and Spanish and a staggering decrease in the 
rates of failing the dreaded math test: from over a third of the students to under 5%. 
 During the process of teaching the students in this way, Juárez Correa discovered 
that one of his students, 12-year-old Paloma, was exceptionally good at solving 
mathematical problems. She intuitively and quickly derived mathematical principles that 
had taken mathematicians throughout history decades to develop. Her score was the 
highest in the nation and this led to renewed hope and access to many opportunities for 
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the girl who had lived in rural poverty, with humble expectations. Her teachers’ method 
helped uncover her talent and was empowering the student in the classroom and beyond. 
   This striking example of engaged, student-centered, and student-led learning is 
inspiring, although it’s not new. Juárez Correa had done some independent and engaged 
learning himself, learning about the work of Sugata Mitra and his experiments with 
minimally invasive education (Mitra & Vivek, 2001). Essentially, Mitra made a computer 
available to children in an impoverished area of India and soon they learned not only how 
to use it, but also the biology content that was placed on the device. The learning was 
primarily guided by the children’s own curiosity and motivation, or as Mitra puts it: “The 
bottom line is, if you’re not the one controlling your learning, you’re not going to learn as 
well.” (cf. Davis, 2013). 
 These successful examples of student-guided learning took place in disadvantaged 
areas, but examples of philosophies as well as successful empirical demonstrations in 
educational practice in middle class USA contexts abound. While a comprehensive 
review of educational approaches that support the value of curiosity and the engagement 
is beyond the scope of this work, it would be difficult to produce credible educational 
research that denies its value. For example, an evolutionary psychology perspective 
argues that the widely accepted educational approach to learning spawned by the 
industrial revolution is in opposition with the ways that humans have evolved to learn: 
through own exploration and curiosity (Gray & Chanoff, 1986). In their applied 
educational approach they show that students taught using their student-guided method 
do well on learning outcomes, career success and report having developed greater ability 
to be independent life-long learners and problem solvers (Gray & Chanoff, 1986).  
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 What these broad approaches in educational theory and practice share is the idea 
that active engagement of students in their learning will produce better learning. 
However, because of the nature of these studies it is impossible to ascertain with enough 
accuracy how students arrived at better learning results. Possible explanations could 
include spending more time on the material, selecting the material that one has prior 
knowledge about (thus making it easier to learn), learning at one’s own pace, trying better 
learning strategies, persisting more in the face of challenge etc. In this dissertation we 
control for many possible confounding variables (difficulty of material, fit with prior 
knowledge, time spent learning) and focus on how the exercise of agency improves 
learning. 
Specifically, in this dissertation we hypothesize that when we are exercising 
personal control by making choices, this should lead to increased engagement during 
learning and subsequently recall of information (Chapter 2). Similarly, information 
associated with our own and others’ causal actions should be more memorable (Chapter 
3). In sum, perceived agency should make information more memorable. 
It has long been known in psychology that what people remember is reconstructed 
and embedded in the context of social interactions. Specifically, the key idea of 
constructivist psychology (for a review see Fosnot, 1996; Kelly, 1955) is that knowledge 
is constructed through interpersonal exchanges and that active engagement of the learner 
in cooperation with others is the optimal way to learn. A similar empirically based theory 
of shared reality establishes how memories are shaped through communication. This 
theory is based on the process by which individuals’ memory is shaped through 
communication with relevant others (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Echterhoff, 
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Higgins, & Groll, 2005). What these well-founded theories emphasize is that what 
remains in our memories is jointly constructed through the process of communication. 
What these theories imply is that the quality of what we learn and how we remember 
information depends upon social coordination that underpins communication, 
emphasizing the importance of understanding one’s own and other’s agency and 
coordination of roles.  
Joint action, in turn, is underpinned by one’s sense of agency – the feeling that we 
have caused an outcome, which then allows us to engage in coordinated action with other 
individuals (Sebanz, 2007). In the following section we embark on defining the concept 
and evidence surrounding the sense of agency. Following that, in sections that correspond 
to the chapters of this dissertation, we explain the ways in which perceived control i.e. 
agency, should increase the retention of any material in memory. 
If we are hypothesizing that the sense of agency may change how well 
information is retained, we should also propose a plausible mechanism for this 
phenomenon. A theoretical approach frames all memories that can be recalled or 
otherwise registered as results of different levels of processing at encoding – 
appropriately termed levels of processing framework (Craik & Lockheart, 1972). This 
theoretical approach contests the view of memory as separate and discrete “stores” (short 
term and long term) with separate and defined capacities, but rather conceptualizes 
memory as a result of an encoding process of differing depths.  
While the levels of processing framework has generated much empirical attention 
that has not yet resulted in a more precise understanding of what depth means beyond the 
traditionally studied ranking of qualitatively different types of learning (Craik, 2002). We 
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propose that in addition to qualitatively different levels of processing, relevance to the 
active engagement of oneself and possibly relevant others could lead to better encoding 
within the same level. In doing so, we use the relevance of representation (ROAR)(Eitam 
& Higgins, 2010) approach to underscore the motivational variables that guide learning 
and influence learning outcomes. 
  For example, the distinctions in manipulations of levels of processing refer to 
qualitatively different processing such as semantic processing and phonemic processing, 
but the vast literature that has been generated also points to other factors other than the 
kinds of processing that result in better encoding and thus more “depth”. As Lockheart 
and Craik themselves note (1990), “depth” is not meant to be an explanatory term per se, 
but rather to inspire explanations and empirical solutions to the problem that it poses. 
Specifically, the kinds of encoding that offer a greater opportunity for elaboration have 
been found to result in better recall compared to less elaboration (Tulving & Craik, 
1975). We propose that motivation and engagement that result from a greater sense of 
agency should increase the depth of processing, resulting in greater memory for 
information when perceived agency is high. 
 In this dissertation, we focus on the effects of agency on learning, and it is 
precisely the sense of agency and self-hood that is one of the most important 
distinguishing features between what are considered to be two qualitatively distinct forms 
of memory: episodic and semantic (Tulving, 1972). The sense of self and one’s agency in 
a memory trace is precisely what is present in episodic memory, giving it an autonoetic 
(self-reflective) quality and distinguishing it from semantic memory. By contrast, 
semantic memory entails information that we can remember, but one that lacks a sense 
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specific episode in own experience where we learned this information. Those two kinds 
of memory were initially seen as separate categories of memory, as interactive sub-
systems of human memory with episodic memory considered to be uniquely human and 
even anatomically distinct from semantic memories (Tulving, 2002).  Crucially, it 
elaborating on material by recalling episodic memories related to that material results in 
improved learning (Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989).  
 In both chapters of the work presented herein, agency features prominently as the 
characteristic of phenomenal experience that enhances learning. In Chapter 2, perceived 
control during learning leads to increased engagement, facilitating learning and recall. In 
Chapter 3, framing an event that participants experience as the outcome of agentic action 
results in better memory for the event despite the fact that participants did not intend to 
remember any information. What we demonstrate in this work is that the perceived 
agency increases how much information is remembered. In Chapter 2 high perceived 
agency results in increased recall by producing greater engagement, while in Chapter 3 
information is retained better when perceived as part of a causal chain of action. 
 
Defining agency – from voluntary actions to responsibility 
Perceived control is inextricably linked with a sense of agency – that we are the 
ones causally affecting outcomes. The sense of agency in turn is a logical prerequisite to 
distinguishing one’s own actions from those of others so that we can participate in joint 
actions performed in our social groups; it is thought that the sense of agency as cognitive 
adaptation persists for that reason (Sebanz, 2007). According to the theorized 
evolutionary causes for the sense of agency, it is crucial to distinguish and correctly 
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perceive our own actions and those of other people because it enables humans to develop 
one of the key features of our survival – joint action. From an emergent joint action in a 
physical sense, people can further build on this precursor of social organization and 
superimpose immediate environment social structures, norms, and even cultures, around 
which joint action further unfolds. Without the sense of self (even in the most minimal 
sense) joint action would not exist in the same way, as a distinction between own and 
other’s actions would not be necessary.  
We could conceptualize of this kind of pre-agentic interaction of individuals 
similarly to the way that a school of fish coordinates actions, where fish orchestrate their 
interactions based on chemical signals and don’t require an understanding that there are 
other individuals and that each fish is an individual too.  Unlike fish, humans coordinate 
actions with an understanding of many layers of social structure. In its most rudimentary 
form, distinguishing ourselves from others through joint actions may be what gave rise to 
our sense of agency and self. While we are mentally coordinating our actions with one 
another, it follows then that it would be advantageous to process information related to 
own actions, and possibly those of other agents, preferentially to other information that 
passes through our perceptual systems. Thus, we hypothesize that exercising one’s 
agency to establish control will improve memory for the outcomes of our intentional 
actions.  
We coordinate our actions on different levels of abstraction: from executing a 
simple handshake to functioning as a group with specialized responsibilities and 
hierarchies. The study of agency also unfolds along these different levels of abstraction of 
human coordination. Critically, the cues to the sense of agency at every level of 
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abstraction differ from the more concrete physical cues to the more abstract social cues of 
coordination. Next, we’ll review the levels of agency inference, focusing actions in an 
implicitly social context and the cues that they entail, as they are most relevant to the 
experimental work presented below. 
The metacognition of agency most likely yields assessments that are accurate 
enough for people to get by well enough (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), and sometimes 
systematically inaccurate (Wegner, 2003; Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 2003). Perceptions 
of who did what can also become deeply flawed when there is enough ambiguity and 
when the cues people use to infer agency are misaligned (Wegner & Sparrow, 2004; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). In other words, the process of agency inference is not 
always diagnostic of actual agency, since people don’t have direct access to this 
knowledge, as phenomenal experience of daily life would suggest.  
However we would argue that although it may not always be accurate, perceived 
agency should be adaptive for human functioning. For one, without the sense of our own 
causality it would be impossible to engage in joint action as discussed above. The 
corollary of this hypothesis is that the events associated with causal action should be 
remembered better (Chapter 3). Perceived agency is also dependent on social cues as well 
(Wegner & Sparrow, 2004), and this perceived agency should change the outcomes of 
cognitive processes such as learning. We hypothesize that when one feels in control as a 
consequence of social cues, such as choice, learning should be more effective (Chapter 
2). 
The study of human volition and agency includes observing agency at four levels 
of abstraction (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Synofzyk, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008); 
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(motor) action1, the sense of agency, agency judgments, and one’s own moral 
responsibility, which now also requires conceptual representations of oneself and others’ 
minds. According to this framework, motor action does not require reporting on or 
reflecting on one’s agency, while the feeling that one is performing a voluntary action is 
already present. The second level requires making judgments of agency by reflecting on 
one’s own action and is often studied as metacognition of agency (ex. Miele, Wager, 
Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011).  
At the most basic level of perceived agency, we can define agency as perceiving 
oneself as the source of a sensory event performing an intentional motor action. 
Reflecting on and making judgments of agency constitutes a higher order of abstraction, 
aptly termed metacognition of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), and has a neural 
signature that is distinct from mere action monitoring (Miele, et al., 2011). This work 
implies that when we perform an action, beyond just monitoring that it occurs 
consistently with the existing motor plan, we also have a separate process that ensures 
having a sense of whether this was an agentic action and who the agent might have been.  
The metacognition of one’s agency also changes over the lifespan (Metcalfe, 
Eich, & Castel, 2010), from wishful overestimates of youth to incorrect underestimates of 
older adults. This adds to the evidence that the metacognition of agency is more than the 
direct and privileged knowledge that we are the cause of our own actions. While people 
are reasonably accurate in most instances, (ex. Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) the point we 
are making is that many cues that aren’t directly relevant to agency impact the sense of 
agency.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Motor action monitoring has two distinct levels, which are not discussed here.  
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Specifically, performance (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Metcalfe, Eich, & Miele, 
2013; Metcalfe, Eich & Castel, 2010) and the focus on intended outcome of one’s actions 
(Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999), which are logically non-
diagnostic of one’s actual agency, often impact the process of metacognition of agency, 
typically attributing (good) intended performance to oneself. In particular, both the 
congruence of actions and outcomes (termed proximal) and outcomes in the performance 
of the task (distal), influence the sense of agency, while only the former are actually 
diagnostic of agency (Metcalfe et al., 2013). The preceding research points to the fact that 
even at the level of judging authorship of one’s physical actions, the perception of agency 
is a result of a complex inference process that relies on a set of cues. 
When intentional action sequences are executed smoothly, this is perceived as the 
default state – while any discrepancy from this state results in decreases in the sense of 
agency (Haggard, 2005; Frith, 2000).  Furthermore, the work on intention priming has 
shown that it is precisely when action selection is difficult (when there are incongruous 
signals) that the monitoring of actions comes online, potentially decreasing the sense of 
agency (Chambon, Wanke, Fleming, Prinz & Haggard, 2012). Action selection related 
cues used in this model, as well as the proximal cues in Metcalfe and colleagues work 
(2013), suggest that early cues associated with action are predictive of assessments of 
agency, although they are clearly not the sole contributors to the sense of agency.  
The focus of the studies reported in this dissertation is on attributions of own 
agency, which are susceptible to both sensory/proprioceptive and social cues in the 
environment (Wegner & Sparrow, 2004) and their effect on memory. However, the cues 
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that we use to change the sense of agency in our studies are more socially mediated than 
the action cues that are most thoroughly studied (as outlined above).  
In our studies, participants report on their level of perceived personal control, i.e., 
agency in the task they are completing, and we review the studies that bear on this level 
of agency perception next. In Synofzyk and colleagues’ framework (2008), the agency in 
a social context is not detailed very much and mainly refers to a sense of moral 
responsibility mediated by reference to socially constructed norms of behavior. The level 
of analysis in this work goes beyond agency that individuals feel for physical action, but 
does not refer to moral agency and exclusively moral decisions. Instead, we examine 
perceived agency in implicitly social situations, but these situations are not necessarily 
relevant to moral norms.  Participants make judgments about their sense of personal 
control in situations that differ in the degree of perceived control, but are neither about 
physical actions nor necessarily relevant to moral decisions. We believe that this level of 
analysis should be included in the framework and requires more study. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2 we manipulate the sense of perceived agency in the task 
using free choice as a vehicle of personal control. In Chapter 3 we use the principle of 
priority to explicitly change the inference of agency at different points in the experiment, 
resulting in events being perceived as part of a causal chain effected by oneself, or other, 
or not. 
In Chapter 2 we use the cue of free choice to manipulate the perceived agency so 
that we can examine its effects on recall for material learned under those conditions. 
While social cues to agency are studied less often, prior research finds that subtle cues 
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such as leading or following in a coaction situation results in different perceptions of 
agency (higher or lower respectively) (Sparrow, 2007).   
Recalling or experiencing situations characterized by high or low control is also a 
method that has been used to increase the accessibility of the concept of power (high or 
low, respectively) (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Smith & Galinsky, 2010), 
yielding important results for cognitive functioning downstream. Though the connection 
between a social construct like power and agency perceived online might seem tenuous, 
cues that individuals use to perceive the power hierarchies in their social environment are 
indeed most often subtle and non-conscious (Smith & Galinsky, 2010). Metacognizing on 
one’s agency may serve a similar purpose, as the use of self report may serve to amplify 
the cues to authorship (Ebert & Wegner, 2010) and is more sensitive to rule based 
inferences, such as explicit cues like free choice (Smith & DeCoster, 1999).  
Perceiving oneself as the intentional origin of an action causes a biased perception 
of the timing of events: actions and outcomes perceived as intentional are seen as 
occurring closer together in time. This phenomenon has been termed intentional binding 
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) and is frequently used as an implicit measure of the 
sense of agency. This non-conscious consequence of perceiving intentional action also 
occurs when predictability of the effect of an action is high (Moore & Haggard, 2008) 
and is modulated by external cues (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009), again pointing to 
the conclusion that the sense of agency results from a dynamic interplay of intentional 
action and external cues to agency (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee,s 2003; Smith & 
Galinsky, 2010).  
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Importantly, conceptually mediated contextual cues impact intentional binding. In 
addition to the typical findings with voluntary finger movement compared to involuntary, 
intentional binding occurs when people erroneously believe that they are producing an 
outcome (Desantis, Roussel, & Waszak, 2011). Moreover, it is enhanced when occurring 
in a moral context (Moretto, Walsh, & Haggard, 2011) and the effect is attenuated by 
priming low power by having people write an essay about an occasion when they 
experienced a lack of personal control (Obhi, Swiderski, & Brubacher, 2012). 
Remembering and writing about an experience of lacking control is conceptualized as an 
operationalization of power (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Smith & Galinsky, 
2010), but the effects of power on cognition have been found to be mediated by perceived 
personal control (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). The forgoing results 
point to the conclusion that while these studies are meant to examine agency at different 
levels of construal (Synofzyk et al., 2008) they nonetheless may have similar effects on 
cognitive processing. Hence, it is plausible that these three disparate phenomena change 
cognition via the same mechanism - perceived agency. 
Individuals differ in the ways that agency is perceived. Interestingly, autistic 
individuals have no impairment at the level of action monitoring and representing other’s 
actions (Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, & Prinz, 2005), while their impairment in 
mentalizing, which requires higher order social-cognitive processes, persists (David, et 
al., 2008). Metacognition of agency in autistic populations is not yet understood and we 
explore this issue by looking at agency inferences of people with high scores on autism-
like traits (Study 2). We hypothesized that the agency inferences made by participants 
who scored particularly high on autism-like traits may differ from those with low autism-
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like traits.  Autism-like traits on a sub-clinical level predicted less reliance on social cues 
of agency in previous research (Sparrow, 2007). 
Furthermore, a claim has been made that autism may confer adaptive benefits in 
today’s informational environment (Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli, & 
Chakrabarti, 2009). This claim has caused great controversy in the popular media and we 
set out to test it by analyzing the effect of autism-like traits on task performance. 
In Chapter 3 we directly induce a sense of causal influence and thus perceived 
agency using a cover story. At different phases during the experiment, participants are 
either led to believe that their actions are causing an effect or not, depending on whether 
the priority principle of causality inference has been conserved or not. Priority principle 
is the most basic of the three general principles people use to determine their own causal 
influence as well as that of other agents or even objects (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).  
The priority principle harkens back to the way causality inference operates for 
external events. Specifically, what Michotte has termed the “launching effect” critically 
depends upon (1954) the first object to move and come in contact with the second with 
the right velocity and lag of movement of the other object. Likewise, when participants 
hear the name of an object just before the stop at that object, they feel a sense of having 
willed that particular stop, whereas this does not occur if they hear the name of the object 
after or long before the stop (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Similarly, the priority principle 
is demonstrated when participants feel greater agency over the movements of hands that 
they are certain are not theirs when they hear a preview of what the hands are about to do 
shortly before the hands perform an action (ex. they hear “make a fist” and the hand 
makes a fist) (Wegner, Sparrow & Winerman, 2004). 
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In addition to priority, exclusivity and consistency are important for creating the 
inference of agency (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Exclusivity refers to the idea that if 
there is another ostensible agent that could have caused the effect, the sense of agency 
should be reduced, which would typically happen in co-action. For example, in a co-
action situation the participants were instructed to read the finger movements of another 
person in order to answer the questions they were seeing on the screen. Even though the 
other person remained inert and they were actually answering questions based on their 
own knowledge, participants’ sense of agency was reduced, presumably as a result of the 
violation of the exclusivity principle (Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 2003). 
Consistency of the intention or prior thought and outcome is also an important 
determinant of the perception of agency. For example, when participants had negative 
thoughts about a confederate as a result of the confederate being rude, they felt greater 
agency over the ostensible “headache” that the participant experienced, compared to 
when the confederate was not rude (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006). 
Presumably, this would also not have occurred if the confederate had reported winning 
the lottery, as this would be inconsistent with the participant’s prior thoughts about the 
confederate. 
In summary, perceiving agency is the result of a complex set of cues derived in 
part from the sensorimotor system, but also explicit cues to one’s responsibility in the 
immediate environment and moral responsibility at a more abstract level. In the case of 
intentional binding all the above cues about one’s agency produce a similar bias in 
cognitive processing of time. In this set of studies we examine whether different levels of 
agency perception have the same biasing effect on learning.  Specifically, in Chapter 2 
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we manipulate agency using the inherently social cue of free-choice (albeit illusory due 
to methodological constraints) and in Chapter 3 we examine how reframing events as 
outcomes of one’s (or other’s) actions at different stages of the agency inference process 
changes the way that the same event is remembered. 
Our memories have long been thought to be a reconstruction rather than a mere 
reflection of reality (Schacter, 2001) and people can and likely often do “remember” 
events that did not occur (Loftus, 1997). In sum, people’s memories are malleable, and 
they are shaped in the context of their interaction with other people and the environment. 
The key component of that experience that we wish to examine in this dissertation is how 
the sense of control over the environment (Chapter 2) and the connection of events to the 
causal influence of a person (Chapter 3) effect how much information is remembered. We 
expect both to lead to remembering information associated with such actions better. In 
this dissertation we will show that when a person feels in control of their environment 
and when information is associated with the actions of themselves or others, this 
information will be remembered better and be more accessible.  
Hence, we put forth the idea that the events that one controls should be 
remembered better (Studies 1 through 3, Chapter 2), as one is likely to be held 
accountable for their own actions in a social context, whereas those events that are seen 
as merely “events” are less likely to be well remembered (Studies 4 and 5, Chapter 3). 
In the experiments presented in this dissertation, we control for what information 
participants learn and we systematically vary the mental states when this information is 
encountered. In Chapter 2, the studies presented show we are interested in the recall of 
word pairs studied for a fixed amount of time and tested on a pre-selected subset of the 
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studied items. In this way, the information that participants see remains functionally 
equivalent in all conditions. However, what we vary is the participant’s experience in 
different blocks/conditions of the experiment. In studies presented in Chapter 2, a 
participant will sometimes have the illusory experience of choosing which items they 
would like to see on the test, in other study blocks they have the illusory experience of 
the computer selecting items and finally, no selection occurring at all. In Chapter 3, 
participants see the same information for the same amount of time, but using the principle 
of priority we aim to vary their experience of the target information as the outcome of 
their actions or not. 
 
Overview of studies 
In the research presented in this dissertation the central question of interest is how 
perceived agency impacts cognitive processing, specifically the memory for information 
processed when one perceives a greater sense of agency.  
What we will try to show in the forthcoming work is that a sense of agency will 
improve learning. In the first set of studies in Chapter 2, we will compare the effect of the 
illusory experience of choice to that of accepting choices made by another agent or no 
choices at all. Participants are indeed attempting to learn in this set of studies and are 
aware that there will be a test, hence we are addressing learning outcomes when one is 
pursuing the goal of learning. The to-be-learned material is not only the items that 
participants think they have selected, but also the items the participants did not choose. In 
this way, we examine the learning outcomes when a person is learning with a sense of 
control regardless of what decisions are made about the material studied. In fact, 
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unbeknown to the participants, their choices are not in fact honored, but given the design 
of the task, they are unlikely to notice this. 
In Chapter 3, we examine how information is retained when the task is ostensibly 
not about learning and any encoding of the information processed is incidental. Here, we 
induce an association with one’s own (Study 4) or other’s actions (Study 5) using a cover 
story and observe how memory differs based on when this ostensible association was 
made. In Study 5 we are able to compare memory for outcomes that were ostensibly 
caused by another student or the participant oneself. In addition to the incidental 
encoding of the target event, we also observed emotional response to the task, 
particularly when overall surprise recall is very low.  
In order to induce a sense of agency in the first set of studies presented in Chapter 
2 we use choice as a vehicle for a person’s agency and examine the memory performance 
on the whole task, not just the items they had selected. The choices that participants make 
in deciding what materials they would prefer to have on the test should induce a greater 
sense of agency, albeit illusory.  
The choices remain illusory in our studies because allowing people to select 
preferred options would introduce confounds, most importantly, the chosen material 
might be easier in general or the participants in particular may have more familiarity and 
prior knowledge with the chosen materials. These factors alone may result in better 
memory, so in these studies we controlled for that possible confound by creating an 
illusion of choice, a feeling that people are exercising their agency, although they were 
not actually given any material that was different from those they received in other 
learning blocks. However, because any of the materials had a .75 chance of being 
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selected on the test, it is likely that participants often saw the words that they had selected 
as the one that they would want to see on the test.  
In Study 1, the comparison condition entailed the same number of choices that 
were made prior to the experiment and thus imposed on the participant. Although this 
condition does reduce the sense of one’s own control, as another agent made the choices, 
it does also increase the predictability of the environment, providing participants with 
ostensible knowledge on what material is more likely to be tested. Importantly, in both 
conditions, the selections made by either agent were not actually impacting what would 
appear on the test, but did provide an illusion of control or lack thereof.  
In Studies 2 and 3 we also added a condition that would most closely mimic 
typical learning conditions outside of the laboratory: one where there is no emphasis on 
any of the materials in particular, rather the learning proceeds without any choices about 
what materials might be more likely to be tested.  This condition involves no imposition 
of others’ choices, nor the freedom of choosing for oneself. However, it also involves less 
predictability of the (learning) environment, because it seems less certain which items 
will be on the test and which will not.  
In Chapter 3, we approach the issue of perceived agency by experimentally 
inducing a sense of connection between one’s actions and the outcome (to be incidentally 
encoded). In Study 4, we compare the incidental encoding of information that was either 
presented as the outcome of one’s actions before the actions took place, after the 
ostensible outcome had already occurred or no causality inference at all. This allowed us 
to test which phase of the learning process the association of to-be-encoded events with 
one’s actions matters most, encoding or recall. In Study 5 we also introduced a condition 
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where the connection between one’s actions and the event to-be-encoded (unbeknown to 
participants) was induced before the event took place, but after the ostensible “actions” 
were completed. We termed this condition “thought priority” because participants were 
aware of their ostensible influence in an abstract sense and likely did not imbue their 
actions with an intention to create an effect. We modeled this condition after the 
experiments on agency inference that show that prior “thought” (or hearing a preview of 
actions to come) is sufficient to produce an increased sense of agency (Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999; Wegner & Sparrow, 2007; Wegner et al., 2004; Pronin et al., 2006). 
Finally, we were interested in whether actions would be preferentially encoded if the 
actor were (ostensibly) another person and not oneself. We examine this in Study 5, 
where we utilize a crossed design such that the priority of the causal inference process 
(action priority, thought priority, no priority) is crossed with who the agent is presented to 





 Choice and explicit learning 
 
Introduction: Greater perceived agency leads to increases in learning outcomes 
Perceived control is arguably an important basic need for individuals’ wellbeing 
(Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 2010). The perception of control over our actions is deeply 
engrained into everyday experience: people rarely question whether their actions are a 
result of their own free will. The proposal that agency is inherent to human behavior and 
that it’s required for motivation is the basic tenet of the theory of social agency (Bandura, 
1989a; 2006). In this work, we do not assume that one’s sense of agency is veridical or an 
axiom; rather we examine how the experience of agency leads to greater learning and 
recall. 
In the following introduction we review theories that led us to hypothesize that 
perceived agency results in greater motivational engagement and more efficacious 
learning. In the introduction included in Chapter 2, we review more proximal evidence 
and research that address our question in different ways. 
 Two theories interested in predicting learning outcomes find their footing in the 
perceived control: Self-determination theory (ex. Ryan & Deci, 2000) and the work on 
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1989b). Self-efficacy captures one’s estimated level of confidence 
that a task can be performed in a given context, defined with varying degrees of 
specificity (Bandura, 1989b). In correlational studies, self-reported self-efficacy has 
positive predictive value for academic success (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & 
Pastorelli, 1996). The sense of self-efficacy could be rooted in active (i.e. agentic) 
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engagement with the material to be learned and thus over time result in a global self-
efficacy self perception. 
However, we cannot take these correlations to be definitive evidence of global 
perceived agency causing an increase in performance. It is also entirely possible that the 
respondents in these surveys are reporting based on past experience: if they have 
performed well in the past, they will have greater self-efficacy and will likely perform 
better in the future. It is also possible that a third variable is what is driving the 
correlation: for example, the participants who report greater self-efficacy may have 
studied more. This should improve both their self-efficacy and their performance.  
Some experimental evidence does exist, indicating that when self-efficacy is 
experimentally increased, performance on the task improves. Specifically, when 
participants are given bogus feedback that their performance in a novel task is either 
falling behind or better than other participants, subsequent performance is better 
following the feedback that boosts self-efficacy (Bandura & Jourden, 1991). These 
results suggest that providing participants with high perceived self-efficacy boosts 
performance beyond the effects of prior knowledge and ability. We would like to suggest 
that one possible explanation for this result is increased sense of agency increasing 
engagement and thus performance. This would obviate the need to posit changes in self-
perception as the cause of increased performance. 
Another theoretical approach that emphasizes the role of agency is the self-
determination theory of Ryan and Deci (2000). Much like in Bandura’s theory, human 
need for self-determination, in this case termed autonomy, is an axiom. In the domain of 
motivation and learning, they then bring to bare evidence that autonomy-supportive 
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parenting styles facilitate intrinsic motivation and academic achievement (Grolnick & 
Ryan, 1989; Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984; Ryan, Connell, & Deci, 1985).  
Self-determination theory proposes that it is autonomous behavior (and the 
environment that supports it) that increases intrinsic motivation and therefore learning 
outcomes. This theory puts forth the argument that intrinsic motivation results in greater 
engagement and persistence in academic tasks and therefore results in better academic 
outcomes. However, it is silent on how intrinsic motivation might affect the process of 
learning itself. Specifically, we propose that perceived agentic engagement with a 
learning task will lead to greater learning compared to the same tasks that are controlled 
by other people and externally imposed.  
While these theoretical approaches are intuitively and conceptually appealing, it is 
not completely clear how perceiving oneself as generally more efficacious or autonomous 
leads to improvements in learning and subsequent academic outcomes. In this chapter we 
examine how the perception of one’s own agency online may improve learning. We do so 
by creating controlled conditions where choices don’t actually lead to selection of 
preferred material (as that would be a potential confound), but do lead to seeing oneself 
as having more agency in that learning block.  
The debate on the issue of agency in experimental psychology begins with the 
idea that people’s perception of agentic control of actions is a result of an inference 
process (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). This social-cognitive process can lead to fairly 
accurate conclusions about one’s motor control (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) as well as 
grossly erroneous conclusions when the correct principles of agency inference have been 
manipulated (Wegner, 2003). In the work described in Chapter 2, we employ a paradigm 
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designed to produce an illusion of free choice and thus increase the sense of perceived 
agency while controlling for one’s actual control in the environment. 
In studies one through three in Chapter 2 we examine how changing one’s 
perceived agency during learning impacts performance on a subsequent test, 
experimentally testing how perceived agency may increase motivation and engagement 
and thus result in significantly greater recall. In these studies we measure the motivation 
derived from control online, during learning and observe its effect on memory. 
 The processing of information that is associated with agentic actions (particularly 
one’s own) differs from that of observed events that do not have that status. Self-
produced actions are easier to identify, as well as those that are more similar to own 
actions (Flach, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2004; Repp & Knoblich, 2004). When two people 
share a task, the mere presence of another person doing their unrelated part of the task 
causes prolonged reaction times compared to when the same task is done alone (Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005), suggesting that the participant may be representing the action 
of the other person. In this work we test a corollary of the preceding data: does the 
information processed when we have a relatively high sense of agency remain better 
remembered than that when our sense of agency is low? 
When considering the effects that a sense of agency has on learning, it’s important 
to keep in mind that the inference of agency is a process that entails organizing 
information represented as the outcomes of own actions in reference to oneself 
(Gallagher, 2000; Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; Wegner, 2008). Therefore, in addition to 
the literature on the effect of perceived control on memory, the self-reference effect 
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provides valuable background for understanding the effects of perceived agency on 
memory.  
Referring information to oneself explicitly - termed the self-reference effect 
(Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) is a powerful mnemonic tool, improving memory for 
trait words as well as nouns (Symons & Johnson, 1997, but see Keenan, Golding, & 
Brown, 1992). Memory enhancement occurs even when information is incidentally 
associated with oneself via incidental choice or transient ownership (Cloutier & Macrae, 
2008; Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Kesebir & Oishi, 2010; Turk, 
Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008; van den Bos, Cunningham, Conway, & Turk, 2010).  
Choice can be seen as an explicit, socially constructed cue to agency, even when 
it affords little actual control over the environment. Cloutier and Macrae show that the 
self-reference effect is particularly powerful when the information to be remembered is 
chosen by the learner (2008), even when the choice does not actually afford 
controllability of the environment. This effect has also been termed agentic self-reference 
and importantly, the degree of memory enhancement correlates with the neural substrates 
underlying this process (Powell, Macrae, Cloutier, Metcalfe, & Mitchell, 2010) whereas 
that is not the case with “assigned” self-reference material. 
In more naturalistic settings, when children are allowed to make choices their 
motivation is enhanced and they learn more from an educational activity (Cordova & 
Lepper, 1996). However, for East-Asian children, learning was enhanced when their 
mothers chose, compared to when their out-group member chose (Iyengar & Lepper, 
1999).  We understand this finding in light of the East Asian concept of self, which 
includes close others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and the idea of exercising collective 
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agency (Bandura, 2000). While what has been termed choice-based processing (Cloutier 
& Macrae, 2008) provides memory boosts in US college students, there may be 
alternative, culturally specific ways of exercising one’s agency. Therefore, we argue that 
it is not choice per se that causes the memorial benefits, but the perceived exercise of 
volitional control, i.e. agency. 
It is precisely the enhanced perceived control that mediates the effects of power 
on cogniton (Fast et al., 2009). Recalling or experiencing enhanced or lacking control 
activates the concept of power, creating cognitive consequences like increased action 
orientation, optimism, and self-esteem – all mediated by increases in perceived control. 
Priming low power decreases executive function (Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van 
Dijk, 2008), whereas high power allows people to extract the gist of information more 
easily (Smith & Trope, 2006). 
If perceived personal control is the mechanism by which feeling powerful exerts 
its effects on cognition (Fast et al., 2009), we should also expect that choice, to the extent 
that it provides the sense of control, has the same effects. Therefore, in a learning context, 
we hypothesize that the increased perceived agency induced by choice-based processing 
should result in greatest motivational engagement and most learning, while the 
experience of assigned choices should result in least information learned.  
In effect, we examined the effect of perceived causal self-engagement by 
providing participants with illusory experience of choice in some study blocks and 
equally illusory experience of pre-assigned computer choices they should register in other 
study blocks. Study 2 also examines the effect of autism-like traits on self-reported 
perception of agency and performance. As we discussed above, autistic individuals have 
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no significant difficulty in co-representing the actions of others in a joint-action situation 
(Sebanz et al., 2005), while understanding the mental states of others poses more 
difficulty (David et al., 2008). 
In order to lay the groundwork for understanding the methods of Studies 1 
through 3, we describe the general procedure in these studies here. The material we use in 
these studies are low-associate word pairs (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004) 
presented in a blocked within participant experiment design, with each block containing a 
learning phase, two questionnaires (Agency Questionnaire and Filler Questions (see 
appendices B and C)) and a cued recall task. The questionnaires were presented either 
after the learning phase of each block or after the recall task. The order of questionnaires 
was counterbalanced across blocks. In each block, participants study 16 low associate 
word-pairs and are informed they will be tested on 12 of those word pairs. Unbeknown to 
the participants, for each of the blocks the items to be tested have already been assigned 
and pre-programmed before the experiment began. Because of this, each item studied in 
the learning phase had a .75 likelihood of being tested in the test phase. What we varied 
next was what the participants believed during the learning phase of different blocks – 
that they or another person were choosing which items they would like to have on the 
test. 
Across the learning blocks we manipulate the sense of control by providing either 
an illusion of choice or computer-assigned choices or taking control away in the 
condition where the computer ostensibly chooses (Study 1). In Studies two and three we 
also include a no selection baseline condition, in order to compare how these conditions 
differ from learning in a way that is closest to baseline: without instructions about choice 
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at all, rather simply being asked to learn the word pairs without being asked to evaluate 
them in any way.  
In addition, in order to control for the difficulty of the materials (lists of word 
pairs, please see appendices A and D) themselves, we had another group of participants 
learn and recall these same lists with the same instructions as we had used in the baseline 
condition. Thus, Studies one and two resulted in a mixed experimental design, where 
choice and order of questionnaires were fully crossed within participant factors and the 
presence or absence of experimental manipulations was a between participant factor that 
allows us to control for the possible difficulty of the lists themselves. In Study 3 we 
instead counterbalanced the sets of materials used across experimental conditions, so that 
the difficulty of the randomly assigned sets was accounted for in the design of the 
experiment (see further details in the description of experiments). 
 
Study 1  
 Methods. Participants in the study were Columbia University undergraduates (88 
participants, 52 female) for experimental credit or compensation of $5 for 30 minutes. 
Two participants’ data was not included due to a software malfunction, resulting in no 
data being recorded. All participants gave informed consent to participate in the study, in 
accordance with Institutional Review Board regulations. 
 The experimental procedure was conducted on MacOS computers using Medialab 
Software (Jarvis, 2008). The experiment was conducted in a mixed design. For one group 
of participants (N=64) there were two within factors included in a 2x2 within participant 
design (Self/Computer Choice, Agency Questionnaire Placement Before/After Test). The 
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task consisted of learning word pairs in four different blocks. The word pairs were 
selected from Nelson and associates online database (Nelson et al., 2004) and were 
selected according to the following criteria: nouns, low forward association, very low 
backward association values (please see Appendix A. for full lists used in Study 1). This 
was done in order to ensure that the likelihood of guessing the right answers if the 
participant didn’t remember them was very low. A total of 64 word-pairs were randomly 
assigned to one of four blocks, using a random number generator. 
 For all blocks that the participant learned there were 16 word pairs presented in 
each block and participants were tested on 12 word pairs randomly selected from that set. 
Although participants had different instructions, either to choose or to mark the computer 
choice, the 12 word pairs that were tested for each block were always the same ones, 
unbeknown to the participant. In order to probe for the suspicion that the participants may 
have noticed that they did not always get the word pairs that they had picked, we asked 
them to report on strategies for learning and choosing items. The experimenter later asked 
them about irregularities. In this way, we found three participants who had suspicions. 
We conducted analyses both with and without these participants, but the pattern of results 
is the same and it did not significantly impact significance levels, therefore we included 
them in analyses reported here. 
 In the learning phase, word pairs were presented one at a time for 3000 ms, with 
both words appearing at the same time preceded by a fixation cross in the middle of the 
screen for 500ms. Participants were also informed that there would be 12 out of 16 items 
on the test. 
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 In two of four blocks, participants were instructed to choose five items that they 
would prefer to have on the test (Self-Choice condition) and they should do this while 
they are seeing the word-pair on the screen and indicate their preference with a key press 
(designated “yes” key and “no” key if they would not like to have it on the test). 
Specifically, the participants were given the following instruction:  
“You will now see 16 word pairs one at a time for 3 seconds each.  Only 12 of 
them will be on the test. The plus sign in the middle of the screen serves to alert 
you that the word pair is coming up. When you see the word pair you can press 
"yes" on the keyboard if you would like the word pair on the screen to be tested. 
You can use "yes" option five times effectively. If you would not like the word 
pair to be tested, press "no". If you press nothing the word pair will simply go off 
the screen when the time is up and the next word pair will appear.” 
 In the remaining two blocks participants were told that they will see five items 
selected by the computer (selection was signaled by a symbol (!) in the place of the 
fixation cross) and that they should press the “yes” key to confirm that they’ve 
acknowledged the selection (Computer-Choice condition).  In both cases, the participants 
enacted a voluntary movement (key press), but in the context of the choice blocks the 
action was perceived as personal control over the environment, as opposed to the 
computer selected blocks. Specifically, the instructions for these two blocks were:  
“You will now see 16 word pairs one at a time for 3 seconds each.  Only 12 of 
them will be on the test. The plus sign in the middle of the screen serves to alert 
you that the word pair is coming up.  However, when there is an exclamation 
mark instead of the plus sign, this means that this word pair has a higher 
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probability of appearing on the test. There will be five word pairs like that.  When 
the exclamation sign appears, press "yes" on the keyboard, to confirm that you 
have seen the exclamation sign. If you saw a plus sign, press "no". If you press 
nothing the word pair will go off the screen when the time is up and the next word 
pair will appear. 
 After the learning phase, the participants completed either the Agency 
Questionnaire (AgQ) or filler questions (please see Appendix B for Agency 
Questionnaire and Appendix C for filler questions). Whichever questions remained were 
presented after the test phase (Agency Questionnaire Before/After test). We wanted to 
control for the possibility that completing the AgQ right before the test may impact 
performance because it amplifies the agency cue and makes the sense of agency 
conceptually mediated while still referring to perceived control in the situation at hand, 
and not an abstract or generalized sense of efficacy. The Agency Questionnaire (AgQ) 
(adapted from Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Sparrow, in prep) was presented on 
the screen with a 1-7 response scale (ex. “How much control did you feel over the 
task?”). Filler questions were formulated so as to account for possible effects of task 
switching and the duration of the period between the learning and test phase (ex.”How 
much did you like the font used in the task?”). Upon completing the questions (AgQ in 
two blocks and filler questions in the remaining two blocks), participants proceeded to 
the cued recall test. The first word of the pair was provided and the participant was 
instructed that they should type in the word that had been presented with it. For example, 
if kitchen – teapot had been presented in the learning phase, participants were cued with 
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the word kitchen and presented with a box in which they could type in the word that was 
presented along with it.  
 After the test participants completed any remaining questions (AgQ or filler 
questions, whichever had not been completed before the test). Finally, in order to control 
for possible effects of the order in which the block appeared we used a Latin square 
design, resulting in four orders of blocks and 16 participants per order. After participants 
completed all four blocks, the experimenter debriefed, thanked and compensated 
participants for participation.   
 Even though the word pairs were assigned to blocks using a random number 
generator, this procedure was conducted once for the whole experiment and therefore the 
possibility existed that some blocks of items were simply more difficult than othersn. In 
order to control for the difficulty of the materials assigned to each block, we had 22 
participants learn and recall the same materials in the procedure that used identical 
materials (lists shown in Appendix A). The procedure was the same in every aspect, 
except that the experimental manipulation was not present. In other words, participants 
were not told to select preferred items or respond when the computer had selected an 
item. Instead, participants were instructed to learn the word-pairs, which they would be 
tested on later. Specifically, the instructions were as follows:  
“You will now see 16 word pairs one at a time for 3 seconds each.  Only 12 of 
them will be on the test. The plus sign in the middle of the screen serves to alert 
you that the word pair is coming up. When you see the word pair press the 
spacebar”.  
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 Instead of signaling which items were selected by the computer by presenting an 
exclamation mark, every word-pair was preceded with a fixation sign. Finally, the 
Agency Questionnaire was not presented, but the filler items were presented in its place, 
therefore appearing twice for each of the four blocks. 
 
 Results and discussion. We computed the measure of agency using six items 
from the scale (average Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83). One item that is reverse coded and 
asked about the control that the computer had on learning was omitted due to low inter-
item correlation. The sense of agency that people reported was higher when participants 
chose (M=4.19 SE=0.12) compared to when the computer chose preferred items (M=3.93 
SE=0.13), F (1, 64) = 7.36, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.11, please see Figure 1.)2.  
 Regression analyses revealed that agency scores predicted performance in that 
block of material, but only when the computer chose and thus participants experienced 
less control, regardless of questionnaire order (βComputer/AQ1= 0.263 p=0.036 
βComputer/AQ2=0.418 p=0.001). Importantly, agency index is a good predictor of 
performance in these blocks even after controlling for engagement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 t conservative Lower Bound significance levels where Mauchly’s test shows that sphericity of the data 
cannot be assumed. We also use the Bonferroni correction for mutiple comparisons where appropriate.  
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Figure 1. Study 1 agency results. Agency index in Study 1 was significantly greater in the 
self-choice condition. 
 
 Engagement was greater for the self-choice condition MSelf= 5.094 SESelf=0.146, 
compared to computer choice MComputer=4.789 SEComputer=0.171 even after we controlled 
for overall percent correct, entering it as a covariate in a mixed model ANOVA design 
(F(64, 1) = 4.418 p=0.040, see Figure 2.). Engagement scores across blocks were 
correlated with agency scores in that same block (rSelf/AQ1=0.400 rSelf/AQ2= 0.480 
rComputer/AQ1=0.520 rComputer/AQ2=0.563, all p<0.01), but these correlations were not 
sufficient to consider it part of one underlying concept and include it in the agency index.  
 Specifically, when we analyzed the Agency Questionnaire scale, including the 
item that asked about engagement, it resulted in a low item-total correlation between the 
total variance of the scale and the item that asked about engagement, indicating that these 
are different underlying phenomena. Engagement is also conceptually distinct from 
agency: while agency refers specifically to the sense of control over one’s environment, 
engagement is a reflection of the strength of one’s motivated engagement with the task, 
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regardless of the level of control. Nevertheless, it’s worth noting that across many 
analyses we found that the correlation between agency and engagement scores was 
between 0.40 and 0.58. Hence we performed mediation analyses in Studies 1-3. 
 
Figure 2.  Study 1 engagement results. Participants reported feeling more engaged in the 
self-choice compared to computer choice condition. 
 
 Next, we were interested in the participant’s performance on cued recall tasks in 
each block, across experimental conditions. Specifically, we were interested in how 
performance in self-choice and computer choice blocks (2x2) compared after controlling 
for the difficulty of the materials assigned to each of the four blocks.  We performed a 
mixed model ANOVA analysis in which within participant factors of choice (self, 
computer) and agency questionnaire placement (first, second) were combined with a 
between participant factor of experimental manipulation (yes, no) in order to control for 
the difficulty of actual blocks of material. This was done because the assignment of 
materials into blocks was pseudo-random, therefore leaving the possibility that by chance 
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some blocks simply contained more difficult materials than others. Therefore, the 
important implications for performance come from the interaction of experimental 
manipulation (yes, no) factor, allowing us to infer whether our manipulation had an effect 
on cued recall performance above and beyond the difficulty of the material itself. Our 
results showed that the choice factor interacted with experimental manipulation (F(86, 
1)= 12.81p=0.001 ηp2 =0.132), such that beyond the difficulty of the material themselves, 
participants performed better on the self-choice block (MSelf/NoExp= 9.250 MSelf/Exp= 9.695 
p=0.319 and worse on the computer choice blocks MComp/NoExp= 9.818 MComp/Exp=8.758 
p<0.05). The estimated mean difference was .445 SE= .444 for Self (Exp – Noexp) and -
1.060 SE=.484 for Computer (Exp – Noexp)(please see Figure 3).  
 The order of blocks in a Latin square design had a marginally significant effect on 
average performance across blocks, such that when the first block was one in which they 
performed least well, their average performance was lower. However, this factor did not 
interact with any of the findings above or significantly change their significance when 
included in the analysis.  
 Additionally, we sought to understand the role of the level of engagement and 
agency in predicting recall outcomes. Because performance across blocks differed as a 
function of their difficulty per se, we conducted regression analyses on average agency, 
engagement and average cued recall scores.  Results of regressions with a single factor as 
a predictor showed that agency and engagement were not significant predictors of 
average cued recall performance, although the factors were marginally significant (for 
agency β = 0.218 t = 1.763 p=0.083, for engagement β = 0.203 t = 1.632 p=0.108). When 
factors were entered into a multiple regression in order to analyze a possible mediation, 
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neither factor was a strong or significant predictor of cued recall performance (for agency 
β = 0.155 t = 1.074 p=0.287, for engagement β = 0.124 t = 0.854 p=0.396).  
 The above regression results indicate that independent contributions of agency or 
engagement to explaining the variance of cued recall are so far inconclusive. We 
hypothesize that the measurement and reporting of agency in particular may rely on cues 
that are not necessarily diagnostic of the actual level of agency. This could in turn affect 
any analyses conducted on self-reported agency. 
 
Figure 3. Study 1 cued recall performance. Cued recall performance is shown across 
experimental conditions (Self or Computer Choice) along with normed performance on 
those materials alone. Computer choice manipulation significantly decreased 
performance compared to normed materials alone. 
 
Study 2 
 Methods. Participants in this study were Columbia University undergraduates 













minutes. All participants gave informed consent to participate in the study, in accordance 
with Columbia University Institutional Review Board regulations. 
 In the second experiment the general procedure was the same as in the Study 1. In 
addition to Self-Choice and Computer-Choice conditions we introduced a condition that 
would represent the way students normally learn and there is no choosing mentioned at 
all. We introduced this control condition in order find out whether it is the decreased 
sense of agency due to involvement of another agent (computer or ostensibly the 
experimenter) that decreases performance or is it that the sense of additional control and 
self efficacy improves performance over and above what participants are accustomed to 
in learning settings. The design of the experiment was 3x2 (Self/Baseline/Computer-
Choice x AgQBefore/AfterTest). An autism questionnaire was administered in original 
paper and pencil format at the end of this study (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley, 2001) in order to assess individual differences based on autism-like 
traits.  In addition to the 60 participants who took part in this procedure, 46 participants 
took part in a norming study, where we assigned them all the same materials to learn 
except that there were no instructions regarding choice, instead participants learned word 
pairs as they normally would have, just as they did in the experimental baseline 
condition. The results of this study are included in analyses of cued recall, but not agency 
and individual differences, as those measures were not present.  
 Results and discussion. The Agency index was computed in the same way as in 
the previous study (6 items, Chronbach’s Alpha= 0.86). There was a main effect of 
Choice on the sense of agency F (1,60)=8.51 p=0.005 ηp2=0.15, such that participants 
reported the most sense of agency when they chose (MSelf-Choice=4.18 SE=0.12; 
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MBaseline=3.76 SE=0.11; MComputer-Choice=3.70 SE=0.13) compared to both baseline and 
computer-choice. Planned contrasts revealed that all contrasts were significant p<0.01 
except computer and baseline, which failed to reach significance. Order of the Agency 
Questionnaire also had an effect on participants’ estimates of agency F(1,60)=9.92 
p=0.003 ηp2=0.17 (MBeforeTest= 3.76 SE=0.10 MAfterTest=3.99 SE=0.11).  
 
Figure 4. Study 2 agency results. Agency index in Study 2 was significantly greater in the 
self-choice condition. 
  
 There was a significant effect of choice on engagement (F(60,2)= 3.588 p=0.033). 
Scores on the engagement measure were higher for choice condition (MSelf-Choice= 4.50 
SE=0.143; MBaseline=4.033 SE=0.148; MComputer-Choice= 4.25 SE=0.163). Engagement was 
a significant predictor of memory performance in nearly all blocks (except baseline/AQ1) 
with the following coefficients βSelf/AQ1= 0.428 p<0.01; βSelf/AQ2=0.464 p<0.01; 
βComputer/AQ1= 0.307 p=0.017 βComputer/AQ2=0.372 p<0.01; βBaseline/AQ2=0.431 p<0.01. 
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Figure 5. Study 2 engagement results. Engagement was greater for the self-choice 
condition. 
 
 We were next interested in participants’ performance on the cued recall task and 
the impact that conditions had on these. We performed a mixed model ANOVA analysis 
with two within participant factors: Choice (self, computer, baseline) and Agency 
Questionnaire placement (Before, After test), and a between factor of Experimental 
manipulation (yes, no) in order to account for possible effects of the difficulty of the cued 
word pairs assigned to the different blocks. We observed the expected interaction of the 
Choice and Experimental manipulation factor (F (106, 1) = 6.264 p=0.010 ηp2= 0.062, 
such that beyond the difficulty of the material, participants’ cued recall performance was 
decreased when the experimental manipulation was present in the computer choice 
condition, while the two other contrasts were not significant MComp/NoExp= 8.13 
MComp/Exp=7.07 p=0.050 The estimated mean difference was -1.055 SE= .532 for 
Computer (Exp – Noexp) (please see Figure 6).  
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 We were also interested in the relationship between average agency and 
engagement scores (computed for every individual) and their average cued recall 
performance score. Because performance differed by condition due to factors such as 
difficulty of the materials themselves, which are not of interest here and were controlled 
for in the analyses of the impact of experimental conditions, we used average 
performance, agency and engagement scores instead. In regression models with a single 
predictor, we found that engagement predicted cued recall (β = 0.260 t = 2.048 p=0.045), 
but agency did not. Further analyses indicated that there was no mediation of this effect. 
 
 
Figure 6. Study 2 cued recall results. Memory performance on a cued recall task across 
conditions (choice, baseline and computer choice) are shown in both the experiment and 
normed (no experimental manipulation) groups. 
 
 In this experiment we also collected data on participant’s autism questionnaire 
scores as an indicator of their autism-like traits. Two participants did not complete the 
Autism Questionnaire and were therefore excluded from this analysis (N=58). Autism 
Questionnaire scores did not significantly predict agency estimates nor did it interact with 













interactions with experimental factors on memory task performance. However, regression 
analysis reveals that higher scores on the scale used for autism screening predict better 
average performance on the memory recall task across all blocks i.e. total memory task 
performance (β= 0.263 p=0.04). Specifically, the subscales of the Autism Quotient Scale 
that best predict performance are Attention to Detail β= 0.201 p=0.13 and Attention 
Switching (where higher numbers indicate inflexible attention) β= 0.223 p=0.09, while 
other subscales (Social Skills, Imagination, and Communication) did not show such 
trends.  We then summed individual scores from Attention to Detail and Attention 
Switching subscales to get an index of attention patterns characteristic of autistic 
individuals. This score predicted average task performance even somewhat better than the 
total Autism Quotient score β= 0.288 p=0.028.  
 
Study 3 
 Methods. Participants in this study were 36 Columbia University undergraduates. 
All participants gave informed consent to participate in the study, in accordance with 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board regulations. 
 The general procedure in this experiment was similar to experiment two. In this 
experiment, the word-pairs were assigned to blocks in two pseudo-random assignment 
procedures using the random number generator. Additionally, the materials from each 
block were assigned to each experimental manipulation an equal number of times, 
counterbalancing the content of each condition to be even across participants. The order 
of experimental condition blocks was randomly assigned by the computer for each 
participant. The basic procedure was the same as in experiment two, except that 
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participants did not fill out an autism quotient questionnaire. Additionally, the two 
random assignments and counterbalancing of materials obviated the need for a control 
group with no manipulations. 
 Results and discussion. The agency index was calculated using items 1 through 
6, as the reverse coded item (7) had low item-total correlation. Scale reliability ranged 
from 0.711 to 0.909 (Chronbach’s Alpha) and the average reliability score was 0.855. We 
performed a repeated measures ANOVA analysis with Choice and Agency Questionnaire 
placement factors crossed (3x2), which revealed a main effect of Choice (F(36,1)=11.606 
p=0.002 ηp2= 0.24, such that participants felt a greatest sense of agency when choosing 
themselves (MSelf-Choice=4.48 SE=0.19; MBaseline=3.73 SE=0.14; MComputer-Choice=3.54 
SE=0.17). Post-hoc tests showed that Self-Choice significantly differed from Baseline 
and Computer choice, while the latter two were not significantly different from each 
other (p=0.36).  
 




 Participants’ sense of engagement in the task differed so that it was higher for the 
self-choice condition, followed by computer choice and finally baseline (where no 
choices were being made, participants simply learned the material). Engagement also 
differed based on when it was measured: after the learning phase (AQ1) or after the cued 
recall task (AQ2), such that engagement was decreased after the learning phase (AQ1). 
This difference was due to an interaction, which shows participants’ engagement after the 
learning phase only significantly decreased in the baseline condition. After participants 
had spent 56 seconds learning word pairs that were flashed on the screen, they reported 
being less engaged than they were after the cued recall test or in any of the other 
conditions.  
 
Figure 8. Study 3 engagement main effect of choice. Engagement was greatest for the 
self-choice condition compared to baseline and computer-choice condition. 
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Figure 9. Study 3 engagement interaction of choice and agency questionnaire placement. 
The interaction with questionnaire placement shows that participants were least engaged 
in the baseline condition, only when engagement was assessed after the learning phase. 
When measured after the recall task was completed, participants’ engagement in the 
baseline condition was not significantly different from either self or computer choice 
conditions. 
 
 We were interested in the impact of experimental conditions on cued recall. We 
performed a repeated measures ANOVA with Choice and Agency Questionnaire 
placement factors crossed (3x2) and showed that Choice had a significant effect on cued 
recall (F(36,2)= 32.561 p<0.001 ηp2= 0.48). When choosing themselves (Self-Choice) 
participants’ cued recall scores were highest (MSelf-Choice=9.32 SE=0.27), followed by 
baseline (MBaseline=7.26 SE=0.43), and computer choice (MComputer-Choice=6.19 SE=0.39) 
when scores were significantly lower than both other conditions. Post-hoc tests showed 
that all comparisons were significant (p<0.05) (please see Figure 10). 
 We were also interested in how agency and engagement predicted cued recall. We 
performed a set of regression analyses with agency, engagement and cued recall scores 
from each block/condition for each participant. Because materials were counterbalanced, 
we had no concern that there would be any confound in these analyses. In single predictor 
 46 
regressions, both agency and engagement predicted cued recall scores (agency β = 0.201 t 
= 3.006 p=0.003; engagement β = 0.248 t = 3.752 p<0.001). However, the mediation 
analysis showed that the effect of agency was in fact mediated by engagement (agency β 
= 0.087 t = 1.070 p=0.286; engagement β = 0.198 t = 2.447 p=0.015).  
 
 
Figure 10. Study 3 cued recall results. Memory performance averages across 
experimental conditions (choice, baseline, computer choice) show that there are 
significant differences across all three groups. 
 
 
Discussion: Choice and explicit learning 
 The results of the studies discussed above suggest that the illusion of choice 
created in the experiments induced a greater sense of agency in the tasks. The first 
experiment showed that ostensibly choosing independently produces a sense of control 
greater than when there is another implied agent doing the choosing, like the computer or 
the experimenter who may have made the choices that the participant passively 
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differences between own and “computer” choice reflected in perceived agency ratings 
were due to an augmented sense of control when the person actively engages in choosing 
during the task or due to the fact that there was another implied agent present in the 
condition where the choices were made by the computer. Although in our manipulation 
the other’s identity was not made salient, it was clear that there were choices being made 
by another agent. The participants were told that the computer selected the items, but we 
cannot rule out that they could have also presumed this was somehow decided before the 
experiment began, and therefore devised by the experimenter. In studies of mind 
perception, computers and particularly human adults who program them are seen as 
agentic to some degree, although lacking experience in the case of computers (Gray, 
Gray, & Wegner, 2007). In sum, whether participants perceived the assigned selection of 
words as one made by the experimenter or the computer, it’s safe to assume that they 
were perceived as being made by another agent other than oneself. 
 While the own choice agency ratings was significantly higher than computer 
choice consistently across studies, the naturalistic baseline condition where there is no 
selection of items or implied agent was only marginally higher from computer choice, but 
was significantly lower from own choice condition. Because there was no selection of 
items at all in this condition, this may have decreased the perceived predictability of the 
learning environment compared to the other two conditions, decreasing the agency 
estimates. Nevertheless, we felt it was important to include it as this is the way that 
learning most often occurs, thus increasing external validity of our studies. 
 Interestingly, there were no significant differences found in people’s agency 
estimates that resulted from individual differences on autism-like trait assessment. This 
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result adds to the evidence that autistic individuals can represent the actions of others 
(Sebanz, Stumpf, Knoblich, Prinz, 2005) and expands them to suggest that furthermore, 
at least for the individuals who are not clinically autistic, they do not differ significantly 
in the process of agency inference based on environmental cues like choice and 
performance. The possibility still remains that if individuals with deeper impairments and 
clinically relevant diagnosis of autism might have a process of agency inference that 
differs from typically developing individuals.  
However, people’s scores on the subscales of agency that reflect a particular 
attentional style did strongly predict better memory performance on this task. While 
researchers have argued that under some circumstances autism-like traits may confer 
talents that are based in hyper-systematizing and hyper-attention to detail tendencies 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2009), it is far from evident that this cognitive style is adaptive. 
However, it could be useful in our task because instead of focusing on the whole meaning 
of a text, participants were asked to connect two ordinarily loosely associated words and 
memorize them. Because remembering details, images and specifics could be a 
successful strategy in this task, participants with autism-like attentional traits performed 
better on the task. Importantly, other subscales, which are important markers of autism-
like traits and reflect impairments in social functioning, did not predict performance at 
all. This suggests that empathizing and systematizing are not, at least in the non-clinical 
population, opposite ends of the spectrum, but are more likely to be independent 
dimensions that do or do not characterize autistic individuals (Baron-Cohen, 2009).  
 To the extent that autism like traits in the non-clinical population correspond with 
the weak central coherence account of their cognitive style, this cognitive style could 
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predict better performance on detail-focused tasks such as the one employed in Studies 
one through three (Happé & Frith, 2006; Happé & Booth, 2008; but see Bernardino, et 
al., 2012 for an alternative interpretation). 
 Across all studies described increased perceived control resulting from perceived 
choice was followed by memory improvements, whereas the perceived imposition of 
“assigned” options was followed by decreased performance. Moreover, the agency index 
was positively associated with cued recall performance. Furthermore, we showed that the 
effects of agency on recall were independent of the level of engagement.  
 Although the contrasts between the baseline and own choice condition were not 
significant in Studies one and two, it’s quite possible that the studies were simply 
underpowered to detect this effect, since the means were always in the same direction and 
reliably significant in Study 3. Hence choice based processing occurs even when the 
choices are illusory and furthermore, the imposition of other’s choices reduces 
performance even in the absence of explicit reference to one’s own choice. Paralleling 
results on incidental self-association by ownership, events that are associated with own 
choices are preferentially encoded compared to no-choice baseline or other-choice. When 
people perceive a greater sense of agency, induced by contextual cues for choice or lack 
thereof they seem to learn information better or worse respectively.   
 Greater sense of agency as a result of an experience of making free choices likely 
enhances self-referential or choice based processing (Cloutier & Macrae, 2008). The cues 
to lack of control (computer choice) likely prime a sense of lack of personal control and 
low power. Prior research has shown that these result in decreased executive functioning 
(Smith et al., 2008). Specifically, Smith and colleagues showed that the ability to reject 
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goal irrelevant information is decreased. Given that in our task employed in these studies 
the cue word provided in the recall task has a low association with the target word, the 
task entails the rejection of high associates before the low associate can be recalled.  
 Hence, the experience of low agency may be similar to that of low power in that it 
results in poorer cognitive performance. While we don’t mean to imply that the socially 
constructed and mediated experience of low power is equivalent to low agency as we’ve 
operationalized it here, we would like to suggest that the mechanisms that both have in 
biasing cognition may be similar. In these studies, low agency results in poorer 
performance and decreased engagement in the task. 
 In integrating results from agency and memory performance sections, it’s 
interesting to note that the metacognition of agency is more sensitive to the presence of 
one’s own choice, rather than the presence of the choice of computer as agent, while the 
performance on the memory recall task is more responsive to a lack of control. This 
finding is in line with the idea that the metacognition of agency is not necessarily 
veridical of actual control (Wegner, 2005). A caveat in this conclusion is that it may be 
the baseline condition that is inappropriately calibrated as a comparison, since the 
predictability of the learning environment is decreased only in that condition. Namely, 
participants don’t have any sense that they know which items might be on the test, while 
they do have the illusion of knowing that for five items on the two other critical 
conditions (Self-choice and computer-choice). 
 Beyond agency, we examined the effects of engagement on memory, finding that 
it has a positive contribution to how many items were remembered. Although the results 
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are not completely consistent, possibly due to low power in Studies 1 and 2, the effect of 
agency on cued recall task performance were in fact mediated by engagement.  
We have also shown that own choice tends to lead to greater engagement 
compared to computer choice. Interestingly, both of these conditions far exceed the level 
of engagement in the most commonly observed learning practice: uninterrupted learning 
without presenting any choices at all. The former is true only when the engagement is 
measured right after the study phase, but levels of engagement seem equivalent when 
they are assessed after the test has taken place. This seems to indicate that when 
participants are neither required to choose for themselves nor register the choices already 
made, their engagement in the learning phase is lowest. Interestingly, we consistently 
observed that under these conditions, despite the low engagement, participants recalled 
more items on average compared to the computer-choice condition. 
 The agentic involvement of the self in the here and now aids learning, while the 
impingement of other actors on one’s choices hurts learning as it results in perceived loss 
of personal control. Framed in terms of potential evolutionary benefits that this effect 
may have (Sebanz, 2007), it would seem advantageous to preferentially encode one’s 
own actions along with their outcomes compared to those events occurring outside of our 
control. This would facilitate successful coordination of actions in situations of co-action 
where tasks are socially shared, creating improved memory for those parts of the task that 
one feels control over. A further extension of this claim would be that the causal actions 
of others and their outcomes should also be better remembered and we test this in the 




 Agency and incidental encoding 
 
Introduction: The relevance of information associated with intentional actions of an 
agent  
“The art of remembering is the art of thinking… our conscious effort should not 
be so much to impress or retain [knowledge] as to connect it with something 
already there.  
(James, 1983, p. 87)  
 Learning does not only occur when we are consciously and effortfully attempting 
to learn, in fact most of our everyday experience does not entail doing so. Still, we tend to 
remember what we had for breakfast and what the person described in an article in the 
newspaper said or did. It has long been known that sometimes not intending to learn 
results in better recall of the information compared to intending to remember the 
information (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). The study in question showed that 
participants remembered more of the statements presented when they were told to form 
an impression, rather than when they were told to remember them and that there would be 
a test. In the case of this study, impression formation instructions were thought to 
produce better recall due to providing better organization and structuring of the material. 
We would propose an alternate explanation that the behaviors may have been more 
relevant in light of their clear relevance to one person as opposed to a mindset that 
required remembering more abstract knowledge and explicit learning. 
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 Appropriately, the novel paradigm we designed for testing our hypotheses about 
the effect of agency on memory for the “outcome” employs a cover story that entails 
providing personality ratings of persons pictured in photographs based on one’s intuitive 
first impression. Later on in the experiment participants will see the names matched with 
the pictures of the people they had rated for how smart, friendly, creative, and strong they 
were. In all of the conditions in our experiments, participants truly did not think that there 
would be a test of their memory and were in fact focusing on their impression of the 
individuals pictured. What we varied across conditions was the way that the connection 
between their actions (ratings of individuals on traits) and the outcome (names matched 
with faces) was perceived; some of the participants thought from the beginning that their 
actions (ratings) would be used to create an effect (assign the most appropriate names to 
the faces), and some participants only found out about this after the fact or not at all. In 
Study 5, we also varied whether the person whose ratings would ostensibly be used, i.e. 
the potential causal agent, was the person themselves or ostensibly another participant 
who had taken part in the study earlier. 
Prior research has found that not all kinds of information are equally memorable. 
Some kinds of information are clearly prioritized: information associated with oneself is 
involuntarily attended even when it conflicts with current goals (Bargh, 1982). People 
preferentially direct attention towards faces (Fantz 1961; Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; 
Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Kleiner & Banks, 1987; Meltzoff & Moore, 
1977; Morton & Johnson, 1991), a particularly rich source of information about an 
animate agents’ intentions. This preference appears in the first year of life (Frank, Vul, & 
Johnson, 2009). In sum, we attend to conspecifics that we see as agents, as well as 
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information relevant to ourselves. Chapter 3 (comprised of experiments 4 and 5) 
addresses precisely this question: How do we remember information that is associated 
with the actions of an agent (self or other) that are represented as causal, compared to 
those that are not?  
Specifically, beyond the mere presence of conspecifics, which evokes greater 
attention, we are interested in how well information will be encoded if the same event is 
perceived as the outcome of one’s own or other’s actions. The causal sequences we 
extract from a complex environment are shaped by the presence of social cues such as 
faces and other individuals and their intentional actions (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; 
Meltzoff, Waismeyer, & Gopnik, 2012; Wu, Gopnik, Richardson, & Kirkham, 2011). 
Therefore, it follows that the information surrounding our own and other’s actions should 
be recalled better than those that don’t have that status. The forgoing all suggests that the 
information that we believe to be relevant to other people in our environment and their 
actions should be prioritized in our memory.  
Furthermore, based on human evolutionary history information related to causal 
actions should be much easier to encode compared to the same kind of information that is 
not relevant to actions that are perceived as causal and intentional (ex. Sebanz, 2007). In 
line with this idea, information that people acquire is structured in causal terms early in 
development and learning cause and effect relationships is shaped by the presence of 
social cues and agents (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; Meltzoff et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2011).  
Most pertinent to the work presented in this chapter, we hypothesize that 
information perceived as relevant to agentic behavior should increase the relevance of 
this information and thus result in better memory for it. The Relevance of Representation 
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theory (ROAR) (Eitam & Higgins, 2010) builds upon previous models of accessibility 
and revises the prototypically cognitive approaches to accessibility so as to include 
motivational relevance. We intend to show that perceived causal influence increases the 
relevance of a representation, making it easier to remember. 
Specifically, previous models of accessibility (Higgins, 1996) emphasize 
frequency, recency, and applicability as the most important factors that determine the 
accessibility of any given concept. The more times a concept has been activated in the 
past, the more recently this occurred, and the more applicable it is to the current “target 
stimulus”, the more likely knowledge is to be activated. Although accessibility accounts 
most often discuss implicit memory measures, this model also accounts for what is 
typically thought of as priming effects – the accessibility of a construct can be displayed 
as a decision or behavior. In this work, we focus on how this model applies to 
accessibility as a basic feature of any information stored as one’s knowledge. 
Crucially, what the ROAR model adds to the previous accounts of accessibility is 
that in addition to these factors, what makes information accessible is its motivational 
relevance. For example, accessibility of information decreases when a goal has been 
completed, or knowledge expressed (Sparrow & Wegner, 2006). The chronic regulatory 
focus of representation of goals also changes the accessibility of information after a goal 
is completed: Striving for gains decreases accessibility rapidly upon completion, while 
vigilance for losses causes a slower drop off in goal accessibility upon completion 
(Hedberg & Higgins, 2012). Thus, differences in people’s motivational styles predict 
differences in the dynamics of accessibility of information in their memory. What’s most 
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relevant to our account here is that as motivational relevance decreases, so does the 
accessibility of information.  
Furthermore, the accessibility of autobiographical memories is also responsive to 
motivational factors (Moberly & MacLeod, 2006). What these studies speak to and 
exemplify is the idea that what we remember is the information that is motivationally 
relevant. The hypothesis behind studies in Chapter 3 is that information relevant to the 
actions of an intentional agent (self (Study 4 and five) or other (Study 5)) should be of 
greater motivational relevance and therefore remembered better, although the information 
that they see is identical. 
Finally, ROAR posits that the key motivations that make some representations 
more relevant than others, are the basic motivations to establish what is true, to control 
the outcomes in their environment and to gain value or avoid losses. Within this 
framework, we would posit that one’s sense of agency is what imbues any action with 
control relevance. It follows then, that when one feels a greater sense of agency over an 
outcome, the memory for information processed should be more relevant for establishing 
control over the environment and easier to recall.   
 One way to increase relevance of information is the association with the self. 
When an event is seen as the outcome of one’s actions it is implicitly associated with the 
self. Early memory researchers established a phenomenon termed the self-reference 
effect: referring traits and nouns to oneself confers an advantage in later recall compared 
to semantic processing or reference to other individuals (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 
1977). Specifically, referring information to oneself explicitly results in improved recall 
of the material: when participants are asked to think of whether a trait applies to 
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themselves, they remember it better later.  A distinct but similar phenomenon, sometimes 
also referred to as the self-reference effect, shows that recalling autobiographical 
information with regard to some information also brings memorial benefits (Klein et al., 
1989). 
 When information is incidentally associated with the self via incidental choice or 
transient ownership, memory enhancement still occurs, even when learning is incidental 
(Cloutier & Macrae, 2008; Cunningham, den Bos, & Turk, 2011; Cunningham, Turk, 
Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Kesebir & Oishi, 2010; Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 
2008). In addition, Kesebir and Oishi (2010) found that birthdays closer to one’s own are 
better remembered, demonstrating a naturally existing memory bias. These studies 
examine the association with the self, hypothesizing salience to the self or the association 
that the information gains to the well elaborated and salient idea of self, but do not 
directly address the role of agency in producing this effect.  
 Importantly, there are significant attention biases for information that is self 
relevant: it draws attention more quickly (Bargh, 1982) and associating information with 
the self via transient ownership increases attentional processing and narrows the focus of 
attention on the object of interest (Turk, et al., 2011). Self-referential encoding produces 
distinct brain activation pattern compared to reference to unfamiliar others, resulting in 
increased activation in the MPFC (Heatherton, et al., 2006; Kelley, et al., 2002; Macrae, 
Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004).  
 Intentional, physical actions make action phrases more memorable, as 
demonstrated in the enactment effect and self-performed tasks (Cohen, 1989; Engelkamp 
& Zimmer, 1989), using different paradigms to show that writing this sentence leaves a 
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stronger trace in memory compared to seeing it done or reading “write a sentence” (for a 
review see Madan & Singhal, 2012). Performing a physical action oneself entails 
processing that fundamentally differs from verbal encoding or observing another person 
perform an action, such as motor processing which is hypothesized to contribute to the 
advantage in later recall (Engelkamp, Zimmer, Mohr, & Sellen, 1994; Mulligan & 
Hornstein, 2003).  
In the studies presented here we control for the possible effect of enactment, i.e., 
the physical action of pressing a key after reading words is constant across conditions. 
What we vary is how the (verbal) events during encoding and recall are perceived: as the 
outcome of one’s own or others’ action or not and when this inference occurs. In Study 5 
we also vary whether the agent of the ostensible causal effect is the self (the participant) 
or other (another participant who had taken part in the study before).  
 Causal learning by effecting actions ourselves or observing others do so, has been 
documented as one of the fundamental ways by which we incrementally construct and 
update our understanding of the world early in human development (Gopnik & Wellman, 
2012). In fact, it’s the actions of other human actors that toddlers preferentially attend to 
in order to infer causal relations in their environment (Bonawitz, et al., 2010). Given the 
importance of causal actions for learning and development, we expect that events will be 
better encoded when they are perceived as the outcome of an actor’s actions. 
Additionally, given that learning from own and other’s actions has such importance for 
development and is ubiquitous in many contexts, we hypothesize that an event will be 
encoded better when it is perceived to be the outcome of the action of an agent.  
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 At the crossroads of studies that compare the self-reference and agentic (i.e. 
causal) action of an individual we find the work on agentic self-reference. When people 
feel more in control over bringing about the outcome to be associated with the self, the 
memorial advantage of agentic self-reference tends to be greater (Cloutier & Macrae, 
2008). Perceiving own causal action in the moment and referring information to one’s 
self activates brain regions dissociable from abstract self-reference by itself (Powell, et 
al., 2010). This important study dissociates the neural substrate when referring to oneself 
in an abstract sense, such as in the original self-reference effect (Rogers & Kuiper, 1977), 
and actively causing an outcome to occur – termed agentic self-reference.   
 What distinguishes agentic self-reference from abstract reference to the self is the 
sense of agency is the intentionality required for “willing” an outcome to occur. The 
effortless perception that we ourselves or other intentional agents are responsible for 
actions relies on an inference process, the metacognition of agency, which we discussed 
in greater detail in the introduction.  
 In our studies we manipulate the priority principle, which is an important 
determinant of the perception of agency (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999): if intentions or 
thoughts related to the outcome occur too far in advance or after the outcome, this would 
mean that one cannot feel agency for that outcome. In the studies presented here we are 
explicitly telling participants that their actions will be or have been causally related to an 
outcome. Thus they see the same event as the outcome of their actions or not (Study 4), 
the outcome of their own actions or those of others (Study 5). It’s important to note that 
we manipulate when the inference of causality occurs with respect to important phases of 
the learning process: encoding and recall.  
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 In Study 4 we examine the differences in encoding of events that are perceived to 
be the outcome of one’s actions at the time of encoding compared to a lack of causal 
structure, or associating the event with one’s actions after the event has already occurred. 
The latter condition makes the event relevant to the self, but only after the encoding. 
 In Study 5 we replicate and extend our findings. We introduce the perception of 
causality of one’s actions for the outcome 1) before the action takes place (priority of 
action, i.e., agentic self-reference), 2) after the action but before the outcome (priority of 
thought, i.e., pre-“outcome” self-reference) and 3) after the “outcome” has occurred (no 
priority/post-outcome self-reference). Importantly, we also introduced all three conditions 
above and made reference to another intentional agent as the cause of the outcome 
(specifically, “another student who participated in this study”). As in the first study, we 
also had a condition where there was absolutely no causal structure or agent mentioned, 
but the time delays between the phases of the experiment and key materials were 
identical. In addition, we measured attention during the presentation of the material that 
was later tested (using an auditory probe as a secondary task) and affect after the task in 
order to assess the impact of these variables on free recall performance. 
 In the following section we present studies that employ a novel paradigm to test 
the effects of associating an event with one’s actions on the memory for the event itself in 
an implicit memory paradigm. First, we set out to test how the temporal order of when 
the connection between one’s actions and the event (which then subjectively becomes the 
outcome) is made and how this affects accidental encoding. In this way we test implicit 
learning that occurs when people are not in fact intending to learn and memorize.  
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 Furthermore, in Study 5 we also test the impact of whether the causal agent is 
presented to be oneself or another person (another student). In an attempt to control for 
the possibility that participants might disengage from the task in some cases, we 
measured their attention using an auditory probe task.  We also measured their current 
emotional state in order to be able to control for any potential differences that the 
emotional state may cause on participants’ recall. Furthermore, we wanted to explore the 
effect of experimental conditions on participant’s emotional reactions, hypothesizing that 




 Methods. The participants in this study were 95 Columbia University 
undergraduates, who took part in this study in return for partial course credit or payment 
at the rate of $10 per hour in accordance with the regulations of Columbia University 
Internal Review Board.  
 The overall procedure was designed so that the events during the procedure could 
be interpreted as caused by one’s actions in the previous phase. Participants made ratings 
of impressions of people based on their pictures, then saw those same individuals’ 
pictures along with their names. Finally, they received a surprise recall task followed by a 
measure of agency designed to assess their current sense of control. The participants were 
told that their ratings of individuals’ traits based on their pictures will be or have been 
used to assign the most appropriate names to those faces. 
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 The study was conducted on MacOS computers using Medialab Software (Jarvis, 
2008). There were four phases of the experiment that were identical in duration and 
content for all participants: in the first phase participants rated pictures of 20 faces (10 
female) (Hancock) on four traits (smart, strong, friendly, creative) on a seven point Likert 
scale. One face image in the center of the screen and one trait label below with a 
centered, horizontal seven-point scale were presented on the screen in random order of 
traits and faces, and participants rated each face on all four traits (20 faces x 4 traits = 80 
ratings). In the second phase they saw the same pictures of faces with randomly paired 
names within the gender of the face pictured and a name. The names were selected to 
match the sample of images. Given that the images of college students used in this study 
were taken in 1980’s we selected the names for these images from the most popular baby 
names in the 1960’s, the approximate decade when the individuals pictured may have 
been born. Out of the top 40 names for that decade for boys and girls, we selected the top 
10 names for boys and girls that also satisfied the criterion of not being included among 
the top 20 baby names for boys and girls in the 1990’s when our participants would have 
been born (U.S. Census Bureau data).  
 The face-name pairings were the same across participants, achieved with a 
random number assignment during material preparation for the experiment. The pictures 
of faces with a name printed below the image were presented to participants for two 
seconds each. In the third phase of the experiment, participants had a surprise free recall 
test and they were asked to type as many names as they could. After completing the test 
in the fourth phase of the experiment, participants completed an agency questionnaire. 
The agency questionnaire (adapted from Wegner, Sparrow & Winerman, 2004) was 
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presented on the screen with a 1-7 response scale (ex. “How much control did you feel 
over the task?”). This questionnaire is meant to serve as a measure of perceived control. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants answered questions designed to probe for 
suspicion about the hypotheses of the experiment. They were asked a) to rate how well 
they thought the names matched the faces, b) how well the names matched their ratings 
of individuals’ traits, and c) to provide an example of a name that they thought matched 
their impression of the person particularly well. There was one participant who simply 
stated that they thought the procedure was bogus and some did not provide an example. 
We analyzed the data with and without these participants and obtained the same pattern 
of results.  
 The two experimental conditions action priority (1) and no priority (2) differ in 
when the sense of authorship is induced: prior to presenting (encoding) the names along 
with the pictures or after encoding and prior to the free recall task. The instructions given 
to participants in order to manipulate the sense of agency during the task state that there 
is a “stable association” between names and how people bearing them are described. 
They are then either told that their ratings will be used to match names and faces (1) or 
that their ratings were used to match the names and faces (2). In both manipulations 
participants are asked to provide an example of a person they know whose name suits 
them well.  
 The third control group of participants were given no suggestion of a causal 
structure in the experiment. In order to control for the delay between encoding and test, 
participants completed a distracter task (D) for an equal amount of time as the 
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experimental condition participants take to read the instructions (see Table 1 for a layout 
of the experimental design). 
 When participants were instructed that there was a connection between their 
actions and the ostensible outcome, they read the following instructions before they rated 
the faces and the names:  
“An analysis of five of the largest national name databases reveals a stable 
association between names and the way people bearing those names are 
described. The study you are participating in is aimed at establishing the nature of 
this relationship. The personality ratings you will provide of pictured persons will 
be used to assign the appropriate name to the photo.  
Please describe in the box below an example of a person you know whose name 
fits them surprisingly well before the experiment proceeds and the next 
instruction screen appears”. 
 This condition was termed action priority, as in this condition participants would 
experience their actions as related to an effect, and the event of faces paired with names 
would be experienced as an outcome of one’s actions rather than simply an external event 
in a sequence, as would be the case in the control condition.  
 When participants were told about the ostensible connection between the actions 
they had performed (ratings of face pictures on traits) and the “outcome” (face-name 
pairings) after the outcome had already occurred, they received the following 
instructions: 
“An analysis of five of the largest national name databases reveals a stable 
association between names and the way people bearing those names are 
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described. The study you are participating in is aimed at establishing the nature of 
this relationship. The personality ratings you provided of pictured persons were 
just used to assign the name to the photo.  
Please describe in the box below an example of a person you know whose name 
fits them surprisingly well before the experiment proceeds and the next 
instruction screen appears”. 
 This condition was termed no priority, as it violated the principle of priority in 
agency inference: the actions that were purportedly associated with the outcome were not 
experienced as related to the event, nor was the event (face-name pairings), experienced 
as the outcome of one’s actions.  







Priority SCF Trait ratings Wc Face-name pairings D Recall 
No Priority  Trait ratings W Face-name pairings SCP Recall 
Control  Trait ratings W Face-name pairings D Recall 
 60s Self-Paced 12s 40s 60s Self-Paced 
Table 1. Study 4 design. This schematic illustration shows the phases and durations of 
different phases of study 4.  SCF- Self causal manipulation instructions (future tense); 2 – 
self causal manipulation instructions (past tense); D- distracter task; Wc – instructions to 
wait while participants’ ratings are used to match faces and names; W – neutral 
instructions to wait. The parts of the text in bold denote those phases of the study in 
which the participants believe that their actions have had a causal impact on the outcome 
across different conditions. 
 
 We manipulated how the face-name pairs were perceived: as the outcome of one’s 
action (trait ratings of individuals pictured) either before the putatively causal action 
(condition 1. action priority) or after the outcome but before recall (condition 2. no 
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priority/after outcome). Finally, the face-name parings were seen as simply a phase in the 
experiment without any causal structure (condition 3. no causality).  
 Results and discussion. To test the memorial benefits of perceiving a causal 
influence over an outcome we conducted a univariate ANOVA on the dependent measure 
of the number of names accurately recalled ANOVA F(95,2) =3.259  p=0.043 ηp2 =0.066 
and found that participants recalled significantly more names when priority was 
preserved and the event was encoded as the outcome of an action M= 8.77 SE= 0.45, 
followed by participants who only found out about the relationship after the outcome M= 
7.36 SE= 0.46 or the control group who heard no mention of causality at all M= 7.35 SE= 
0.43 (the latter two groups were not statistically different, while the first group differed  
significantly from both p<0.05. Please see Figure 11). In ANOVA analyses reported in 
Studies four and five, least significant difference (LSD) post hoc tests were used. 
 Significant differences in the agency inference measured at the end of the 
experiment were not observed  (5 items Cronbach α= 0.673). As agency was measured 
after the recall test, and performance is highly predictive of agency judgments (Metcalfe 




Figure 11. Study 4 free recall results. When the causality inference occurred before action 
(priority), after the outcome, but before the free recall task (no priority) or no causality 
inference occurred at all (control).  
 
 When participants thought that the names will ostensibly be matched based on 
their ratings from the beginning of the experiment they recalled more names compared to 
participants who were only informed of the aforementioned ostensible relationship after 
rating the faces and viewing names (but before recall). The results suggest that when 
experiencing an event as related to one’s own actions, the same material is better 
remembered compared to when this association has been made only after the event has 
taken place or not at all.  
 Participants’ sense of agency was reduced when they were told of their causal 
influence after the outcome had already occurred, compared to those who were informed 
of their causal effect at the beginning of the experiment. However, participants who were 
not presented with any agency information felt a sense of control not dissimilar to those 
who were informed of their causal influence at the beginning of the experiment. De facto, 












Action Priority No Priority Control 
Number of names recalled (average) 
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induced a decrease in perceived agency. Decrease in perceived agency occurred when 
participants were informed of the causal relationship after the outcome, whereas 
participants who exerted a causal effect on the outcome did not perceive themselves as 
significantly more in control than control group participants where no mention of 
causality was made at all.  
 
Study 5 
 The aims of Study 5 are to replicate and extend findings in Study 4. The materials 
and overall procedure in this experiment were similar to Study 4, with self causal 
reference now examined at three time points during the experiment and a new factor of 
other causal reference is introduced in order to assess the relative impact of self compared 
to other ostensible causal reference.    
 Methods. 142 Columbia undergraduate students participated in this study for 
partial course credit or monetary compensation of $5, according to the regulations of 
Columbia University Internal Review Board. Three participants failed to follow 
instructions, and we excluded them from the analyses. We also ran the same analysis with 
these participants and found the same pattern of results. 
 In the experiment design in Study 5, in addition to inducing causal self relevance 
before the action (trait ratings) and after the outcome (face-name pairings), we introduced 
an additional condition where causal self-reference is induced just prior to viewing the 
ostensible outcome of one’s actions. This results in three conditions of causal self-
reference (pre action – “action priority”, prior to outcome but post action – “thought 
priority”, and post outcome – “no priority”). We were also interested in the impact of the 
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causal reference being made relative to one’s own self as opposed to an ostensible other 
intentional agent, such as another student participating in the study. Therefore we 
introduced three additional groups where other causal reference is made at the same time 
points in the causal sequence as was done with reference to the self, resulting in three 
additional conditions. In addition we also included a control condition where no causal 
reference was made at all – “no causality”, as in Study 4 (please see table 2 for the 
resulting study design). 
 In order to manipulate the causal self or other reference we used essay-style texts 
citing studies, most of which were not fictional, about the relationship between people’s 
names and characters in order to make the cover story of the study more believable. In an 
effort to control for the time interval and the kind of content between important phases of 
the experiment (trait ratings (action), face-name pairings (outcome), and the free recall 
task participants read a text about names (Names, please see Appendix K) for a fixed 
amount of time (195 seconds), instead of a distracter task used in Study 4. This also 
addresses a potential caveat in Study 4 that the experimental manipulation may have 
















a) Trait ratings  
b) Letter ranking SC(PF) 
Face-name 
pairings Name 










a) Trait ratings  
b) Letter ranking OC 
Face-name 
pairings Name 
No Priority  a) Trait ratings  b) Letter ranking Distract 
Face-name 
pairings OC 
Control No Agent  
a) Trait ratings  
b) Letter ranking W 
Face-name 
pairings D 
Duration  195s Self-Paced 195s 40s 195s 
Table 2. The differences in procedure based on the conditions in study 5. The table 
represents conditions employed in the study and highlights key differences in procedure 
based on the conditions in Study 5. In this table, SC denotes self-causal text and the 
designation in the brackets indicates whether the key part of the induction was written in 
future (F), future and past (FP) or past tense (P) in order to correctly represent the 
connection between participants’ actions and their outcomes. The texts used are shown in 
appendices G though K. Bold text in the table indicates that in that condition during that 
phase of the experiment, the participants would have made causal connections between 
their actions and the outcome. 
 
In order to make the cover story more convincing, in addition to the trait ratings 
of faces (this procedure was identical as Study 4), we also had participants rank letters for 
how associated they seem to be with a trait. Participants ranked letters for how closely 
associated they are with the trait “STRONG” (K, O, T, N, I, M, R, F), “CREATIVE” (W, 
Z, F, Y, H, Q, E, V), “FRIENDLY” (S, O, E, A, I, B, C, U) and “SMART” (G, Q, K, X, 
I, T, N, E). The key differences in experimental condition of Study 2 are highlighted in 
Table 2. 
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As described in the table above, there were three points during the experiment at 
which the connection between one’s actions and the ostensible outcome could be made: 
before the action (Action priority) participants read an article we designed for this study 
(presented in Appendix G) which claims that there is a connection between how people 
are perceived, their names, and how those names sound. Importantly, it also emphasized 
that in this experiment an algorithm will be used to assign names to faces based on their 
ratings. In the thought priority condition (which we added in addition to Study 4 
conditions), participants learned of this connection after the actions were competed, but 
before the outcome had occurred (please see Appendix H for the text of the article).  
Finally, in the no priority condition, the realization of the connection between 
actions (please see Appendix I for the full text) and outcomes only occurred after the 
outcome, but before the surprise recall task. In this condition, we were inducing self-
relevance, but only after the event had already occurred and had been perceived as 
merely an event in a relatively unstructured sequence. This condition presents a very 
conservative case of self-reference. Normally, in self-reference tasks participants will try 
to relate material to themselves as they are learning it, i.e., during encoding. In this case, 
when self-relevance is increased after the information that will later be tested, but before 
the surprise recall task, we are interested in what differences may arise with respect to the 
control condition where there is no reference to the self or other at all.  
In addition to experimenting with when in the ostensible causal chain the causal 
inference took place, we crossed these three conditions with who the agent of the causal 
influence was. Namely, we introduced three additional conditions where participants 
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were told that the ratings of another student would be used (please see Appendix J for the 
full text).  
 In addition to recall and explicitly reported agency that we measured in Study 4, 
we included additional dependent variables that are relevant for the mechanism of the 
effects of agentic involvement and self-reference on memory. While the names and faces 
were presented we introduced an auditory probe on four trials and recorded participants’ 
reaction times to probes as a measure of attention. This method has been used as a 
measure of attention dedicated to the primary task (reading names printed below images 
of faces) (Posner & Boies, 1971).  Longer reaction times to the probe indicate that the 
participant’s attention was focused on the focal task at hand, in this case the stimulus 
material of images of faces with a name printed below each image.  
 In addition to responding to the Agency Questionnaire used in Study 4, we 
introduced a procedure aimed at assessing agency implicitly and thus avoiding potential 
biases of introspection and reporting on one’s experience. The procedure (based on Repp 
& Knoblich, 2004) found that non-experts could not differentiate between the set of tones 
they produced and ones that were generated by the computer. We modified and extended 
this paradigm so that participants guessed how many tones they produced. Namely, 
before the experiment began, participants listened to ten sets of four tones and were asked 
to replicate the set they had just heard by clicking on the mouse in the same rhythm.  
Later in the experiment, after they had completed the free recall task, participants listened 
to 20 tone sets, half of which were produced by the computer with the other half 
produced by other people whose responses were recorded prior to the experiment. The 
participants were then asked to determine whether they had produced each set of tones or 
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if it was the computer who produced the set of tones they had just heard. They had no 
prior assumptions about frequency of either category and Repp and Knoblich (2004) 
previously found that non-experts (non musicians) could not distinguish their own 
produced tones and those produced by the computer. Because the participants were 
essentially guessing, we took the higher number of self-attributed tones as an implicit 
indicator of the sense of agency. Because of its implicit nature, this procedure occurred 
right after the article that followed the presentation of the names and faces and just before 
the surprise free recall task was completed.  We also administered the agency 
questionnaire we used in Study 4 after this procedure was completed (see Appendix M, 
adapted from Wegner, Sparrow & Winerman, 2004). 
 We explored whether mood changes were induced as a result of our 
manipulations and whether they could mediate the effect on recall. Therefore at the end 
of the experiment participants filled out a Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS) questionnaire (see Appendix N) used to measure affective state (Watson, Clark 
& Tellegen, 1988).   
 Results and discussion. Participants performed better on a surprise recall task 
when they associated either their own or others’ actions with the outcome prior to its 
occurrence, but not when they made the connection between actions and outcome after 
they had already seen both M priority of action=4.26 SE=0.35 M priority of thought= 3.96 SE=0.34 
M no priority= 3.10 SE=0.34  F(118, 2)=3.08 p=0.05 ηp2= 0.05. Post hoc tests show that 
across the self and other factors, memory performance, when there’s no priority, is 
significantly lower than action priority and marginally lower than thought priority. There 
were no significant differences in memory for names between the self- and other-
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intention groups M self= 4.01 SE=0.27 M other= 3.54 SE=0.29 F(118, 1)= 1.38 p=0.24 ηp2 =  
0.01  and no significant interactions (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. Study 5 free recall results - Priority. Average number of names recalled was 
greater for the action priority and thought priority compared to no priority. The causality 
inference occurred either before the “action” (action priority), before the “outcome”, but 
after the “action” (thought priority) and after the “outcome” (no priority).  
 
We also compared the self and other with the control condition where there was 
no mention of causality. When action priority is preserved, both self and other conditions 
recall significantly more names M self/action priority= 4.24 SE=0.47 M other/action priority= 4.29 
SE=.53  than when there is no causality inferred M no causality = 2.24 SE=.47 F(59, 2)= 5.82 
p=0.005 ηp2 =  0.17 (both former conditions are different from the latter (p<.01) but 
statistically equivalent to each other). 
Likewise, when thought priority is preserved, both self and other conditions recall 
significantly more names M self/thought priority= 4.14 (.43) M other/thought priority= 3.78 (.46) 












Action Priority Thought Priority No Priority 
Number of names recalled (average) 
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0.16 (both former conditions are different from the latter (p<.01) but not statistically 
different from each other). 
When the inference of causality is induced after the event has already occurred, 
we’ve seen that the overall performance is lower than when the priority principle is 
conserved and causality inference happens before the outcome. However, compared to no 
mention of causality, only the self/no priority condition performs significantly better than 
in the absence of any causal inference M self/no priority= 3.65 SE=0.40 M other/no priority= 2.55 
SE=0.45 M no causality = 2.24 SE=0.42 F(62, 2)= 3.29 p=0.044 ηp2=  0.10. Post hoc 
comparisons reveal that the recall performance in the self/no priority condition is 
significantly greater from no causality (p<0.05) and marginally better than other/no 
priority (p=0.07), while other comparisons are not significant.   
Because the pattern of results were similar in the preceding analyses, we averaged 
the number of names recalled across priority of causality inference factor in order to 
compare self, other and the control condition (see Figure 13.) 
 
Figure 13. Study 5 free recall results – Self/Other/Control. The average number of names 
recalled on the surprise free recall test. The Self and Other conditions are collapsed 
across the priority factor in this illustration of results. Participants in the Self and Other 






Self(avg.) Other(avg.) Control 
Number of names recalled (average) 
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 After averaging response times across eight trials (out of 20) in which the 
auditory probe appeared, response time was log transformed, so as to not violate 
assumptions of ANOVA analysis. There were 21 participants who did not respond on two 
or more trials and are thus excluded from this analysis. These participants were 
distributed equally across groups. An ANOVA was conducted across 3x2 cells, with 
Priority of causality inference and self/other factor fully crossed. There were no 
significant differences found, indicating participants were paying attention to the primary 
task equally across these conditions.  
Since other and self conditions did not differ significantly across priority of 
causality inference, we averaged these values collapsing the priority factor and compared 
them to the condition where there was no causality and thus no agent mentioned at all. 
We found that conditions where self and other are mentioned differ significantly from no 
causality F(118, 2)=3.62  p=0.03  ηp2 =0.06 where self and other condition averages were 
higher than no causality Mself = 2.76 SE=0.015 Mother =2.78 SE=0.017 Mno_causality = 2.69 
SE=0.027. Post hoc tests show that self is marginally higher, while the contrast for other 
was significant (p<0.05).   
In addition, average reaction time to auditory probes, where shorter reaction times 
indicate less attention paid to the primary task at hand, was correlated with memory 
performance on a later recall test for the primary task material r(118)= 0.184 p=0.046. 
This result confirms the relevance of this measure as well as the significant effect of 
attention paid to the primary task on the quality of recall of information contained in the 
primary task later. 
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 We found no significant differences among conditions on the agency index 
(Cronbach α = 0.79). The agency index was significantly correlated with free recall 
performance r=0.264 p=0.002. We suspect that the impact of performance on the agency 
judgment and its temporal distance from when causality inference was made contributed 
to this measure’s lack of sensitivity to the manipulation.  
There was an effect of priority on the implicit agency task such that when priority 
principle was fully preserved (action priority) participants attributed significantly more 
events to themselves F(118,2)=3.22  p=0.043 ηp2 =  0.054 Maction priority=50.89 SE=2.36 
Mthought priority=46.74 SE=2.33 Mno priority=42.54 SE=2.28. Action priority significantly 
differed from no priority (p=0.014) and thought priority contrast with action priority 
failed to reach significance (p=0.18). There was no significant difference between self 
and other conditions overall and no interactions. 
 We measured the affective state of participants in order to control for any possible 
impact that current affect may have on performance. Our results indicate that positive and 
negative affect do not significantly impact memory performance, indicated by regression 
analyses yielding non-significant results. Including this variable in the analyses did not 
change the patterns of results obtained. However, we did find that participants who had 
been informed of their causal influence at the beginning did have greater negative affect, 
while there were no differences in positive affect. Negative affect was computed as the 
sum of all emotions listed as negative (11 items) and positive affect as the sum of positive 
emotions (11 items), according to the original instructions for the use of this scale 
(Watson et al., 1988). There was an effect of priority on the negative mood such that 
when priority principle was fully preserved (action priority) participants reported 
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significantly greater negative mood F(118,2)=5.82  p=0.004 ηp2 =  0.094 Maction 
priority=17.71 SE=0.86 Mthought priority=15.51 SE=0.85 Mno priority=13.60 SE=0.83.   
This difference was driven by participants who had performed more poorly 
(recalling up to 20% of the names they had seen), indicating that they may have felt more 
responsible for their low performance than those who had not been as involved in the 
study from the beginning. We found an inverse correlation between negative mood and 
performance, but only for those participants who made the causal inference before the 
ratings (action priority), hence preserving the priority of action to outcome (regardless of 
whether the ostensible agent was self or other) r(39)= -0.322 p=0.046.  
Additionally, the difference in negative mood was primarily driven by 
participants whose performances were low. For low performers (defined by a median 
split of all participants on number of names recalled), action priority showed significantly 
greater negative affect M=20.35 SE=1.36 compared to thought priority M=15.95 
SE=1.42 p=0.028 and no priority M=13.41 SE=1.08 p=0.000, while those differences 
were not significant for high performers (defined by a median split).  Hence, we conclude 
that greater negative mood was induced by poor performance on the test, but only when 
participants were aware of the causality of their actions or those of another agent (action 
priority condition). Please see Figure 14 for results of low performers.  
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Figure 14. Negative affect score – Priority/low performance. The sum of negative 
emotions listed in PANAS was averaged across the causality inference priority factor for 
participants who had performed more poorly overall (defined by a median split on total 




Discussion: Agency and incidental encoding 
 
 Preserving either action or outcome priority in causal inference produced better 
memory for the outcome. Specifically, when the causal inference was made before the to-
be-encoded event (action priority and thought priority), participants remembered more 
material (names) compared to when the connection to one’s actions was made after the 
event took place or not at all.  
Interestingly, we did not find sufficient evidence that the one’s own causal 
influence results in better incidental encoding over that of another agent. When two 
people share a task, the mere presence of another person doing their part causes 












Knoblich & Prinz, 2005), suggesting that the participant may be representing the action 
of the other person.  Importantly, the goal oriented, i.e., agentic actions of our selves and 
our conspecifics have substantial neural overlap in the mirror neuron system (Grafton 
Arbib, Fadiga & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, et al., 1996; for a review see Iacoboni, 
2009) and understanding the intentions and actions of other people begins with 
understanding our own (Meltzoff, 2007) while also sharing much of the neural substrate 
for the process (Mitchell, Banaji & Macrae, 2005).   
The kind of coordination that occurs between individuals sharing a task moderates 
the memorial advantage typically found in self-reference effect: behavioral synchrony 
eliminates the advantage of self over other related nouns (Miles, Nind, Henderson & 
Macrae, 2010). In our task the self and other are never contrasted and thus the self-
reference effect is not observed.  
In addition, critical reviews of the self-reference effect find that the self-other 
difference is inconsistent when the to-be-remembered materials are not (trait) adjectives 
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). Similarly, when reference to either the self or other is not 
evaluative, and the target material are nouns (Keenan, et al., 1992), and quite concrete 
ones (abstract material produces greater self-reference differences (Czienskowski & 
Giljohann, 2002)), the self-reference advantage compared to referring to familiar others is 
not found. The self-reference effect is not present in highly altruistic Japanese adults 
(Nakao, et al., 2012), emphasizing the importance of the self-other psychological distance 
and the frequency of the practice of referring to oneself. Hence, it is possible that the way 
that our studies were designed induced little distance between the participant and the 
ostensible other that was another student who had taken part in the same study before. 
 81 
This kind of behavioral synchrony may have produced a lack of significant difference 
between the self and other related memory, given that it provided the same perspective, 
relevant to an in- group member. 
In summary, we find that outcomes of actions are better encoded in memory 
compared to seeing the same event as unrelated to agentic behavior. When the actions 
and thoughts about one’s causal influence on an event precede it, conserving the priority 
principle, the event is encoded better.  
This is consistent with several lines of research favoring the salience of actions in 
terms of their effects on memory. However, our paradigm differs from the enactment 
effect (Cohen, 1989) in that the number of cues and richness of experience is unlikely to 
differ across conditions, or at least it is not due to the presence of physical actions in one 
condition over another. What we vary is how those actions are experienced in terms of 
their causal influence. Given that we did not find any difference between action priority 
and thought priority, this suggests that perceiving the actual actions as causal (which only 
occurs in the action priority condition) is not a necessary component of the increased 
memory for events that are construed as the outcome of those actions.  
We examine the agentic component of agentic self-reference effect (Cloutier & 
Macrae, 2008; Powell et al., 2010), in an attempt to tease out the contributions of agentic 
action and referring to the self. While the difference between self and other was not 
found, the effect of representing an event as the outcome of causal action clearly 
distinguishes information in memory compared to the same information represented in a 
sequence that violates the principle of priority and does not form a causal inference. This 
suggests that it is possible that even when the advantage of self over other agent is found 
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in agentic self-reference compared to other, the contribution of representing information 
as part of a causal chain related to an agent has a greater effect in boosting the relevance 
of information in memory and thus subsequent recall. 
Again, we do not claim that the self and other as agent do not ever differ in terms 
of their consequences for the relevance and thus memory for information. In fact we see 
that when information is represented without any causal structure or agent (control 
condition) it consistently results in the least information being remembered.  
The affective state, either positive or negative, was not associated with memory 
performance. Interestingly only when action priority was preserved, the participants who 
performed particularly poorly felt worse than those in other conditions. This result is 
particularly striking in light of the fact that these participants also performed better than 
participants in other conditions. However, because it was a surprise recall test, overall 
scores were low (approximately 20% of the names presented were recalled), so this was 
likely construed as a negative outcome. We’d suggest they felt more responsible for the 
poor result they’d achieved, although unbeknown to them, they did better than 
participants in any other condition.  
This result is similar to the one that was obtained in a previous study where 
participants were asked how responsible they felt for having caused a confederate’s 
headache after having negative thoughts about them prior to the event. Presumably, those 
participants who felt more responsible for the negative outcome would have felt worse 
about the fact that it happened (Pronin et al., 2006). 
Theoretically, this finding is predicted in the ROAR framework (Eitam & 
Higgins, 2010) as motivationally relevant outcomes should amplify responses to those 
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outcomes whether they be positive or negative. Hence, the result of the test, especially 
when particularly low, should have greatest emotional impact on participants. In this 
case, it resulted in feeling most negative emotion. However, had participants done well 
and perceived their performance as such, we would expect them to feel greater positive 
emotion when they see the outcome as the result of causal actions. 
We found no differences in the amount of cognitive resources (attention measured 
with an auditory probe attention task) that participants devoted to the primary task based 
on the timing of causality inference. However, participants paid significantly less 
attention to the task at hand when there was neither agent (self or other) or causality 
inference involved (control condition). Hence, the participants’ degree of attentional 
investment could account for the consistently lowest observed memory performance in 
this condition.  
However, the differences in memory performance we observed based on 
perceiving the event as the outcome of a causal action cannot be accounted for with the 
amount of attention dedicated to the task. This finding confirms previous work showing 
that agents get more attention, and it also suggests that the differences in memory 
performance that were found based on agency inference cannot be accounted for using an 
attentional mechanism. Rather, we would propose that the increased accessibility of 
events processed in a causal sequence results from the motivational relevance that the 
implied sense of agency confers.  
 The memorial advantage of thought and action priority was not mediated with 
greater attentional resources dedicated to encoding. However, it seems likely that more 
subtle attentional differences may exist potentially showing a pattern of activation similar 
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to incidental ownership (Turk, et al., 2011). Namely, when an object is assigned to a 
person during a task, the person will attend to it more quickly, showing a different EEG 
pattern of attention.  
 Because attention during encoding is unlikely to be the explanation for the 
difference in recall across levels of causality inference induction, we turn to motivational 
relevance for an explanation of the potential mechanism. We can frame the observed 
differences in memory performance in terms of potential motivational differences that 
drive the relevance and accessibility of information (Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Outcomes 
of actions have greater relevance for controlling what happens in the world, and thus 
have greater motivational relevance. Additionally, because the task was centered around 
finding the best names for the faces and their corresponding traits, inducing a causal 
connection also increased the relevance of the information for finding out what is true 
about the world, increasing epistemic relevance. 
 Similarly, associating an event with an individual even when it’s not related to 
intentional action may result in additional value and control relevance added to this 
information because of the greater relevance that agents have compared to objects. In our 
experiments (Studies four and five), we were able to compare memory in conditions with 
different levels of causal influence (action priority, thought priority, no priority) of agents 
(self/other) to a condition where there was no causal structure related to an agent at all. 
The results showed that when the inference of causality occurs prior to encoding, the 
recall is greater across studies regardless of who the agent is (self or other in Study 5).  
 However, in the no priority condition, when the participant is told of the 
connection between their actions after they have already seen the to-be-recalled material, 
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we should theoretically expect that the more relevant information is, the longer it should 
take to forget. The results show that in Study 4 there was no difference between recall for 
no-priority (with self as the agent) and the control condition. This difference did however 
emerge in Study 5. We suspect that the reason for the difference across these two studies 
is the fact that the delay between the to-be-remembered event and recall is 60 seconds in 
Study 4 and 195 seconds in Study 5. The shorter time interval in Study 2 allows for less 
“decay” of the memories to take place, possibly obscuring any difference that might 
exist. Interestingly, Study 5 showed that there was no significant difference between 
other/no priority and the control condition. This suggests that who the agent is may only 
matter for the maintenance of information in memory after the encoding has already 
taken place. However, given that this result is novel and has not yet been replicated, this 
claim still remains somewhat speculative. 
While perceiving the event as the outcome of actions was followed by 
significantly greater memory performance, the agency inference process was not affected 
in the same magnitude and it is possible that this effect became too small to detect with 
the existing sample size in Studies four and five. In addition, performance scores 
significantly impact the metacognition of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) and this 
may also have contributed to a lack of observed difference in agency inference.  
We did observe differences based on when the causal inference was made (action 
priority) in the novel implicit agency task we used in Study 5. Participants tended to 
attribute more of the ambiguous sets of tones to themselves when they were told of their 
ostensible causal influence before they performed the ostensible causal actions (action 
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priority condition). In this task we did not find any differences between self and other, 
however.   
If we were to assume that the observed lack of difference in perceived agency 
between self and other conditions is not due to measurement confounds and significant 
variability between participants in the levels of reported agency, the non-significant 
difference between self and other seems particularly puzzling. It means that in the context 
of our study, where the causal influence was manipulated in an abstract fashion (see 
descriptions of procedures for Study 4 and five), reports of agency differed little across 
conditions that indeed had significant differences in other domains. The effect of priority 
of causal inference was present, but the difference between self and other as agent was 
not detectable.  
In understanding this remarkable similarity in agency inference, it is important to 
emphasize that the actions of others can sometimes feel agentic, particularly if the 
interpersonal distance is small and the construal of self is collectivistic (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 1999). Alternately, social cognition researchers have theorized that people often 
function in “we mode” where the presence of another agent is implicit, but quite effective 
in changing people’s cognitions (Gallotti & Frith, 2013). The assumption of cognition in 
the “we mode” is that cognitive processes occurring in each individual will be changed 
when there is an implicit assumption of acting together towards a goal. The task we 
employed (rating faces on traits that will then be associated with appropriate names) and 
the way “other” was represented (as another student who had completed the same task) 
would facilitate cognition in the “we mode”, resulting in little difference in recall in the 
self and other conditions. In summary, if the participants were co-representing the mental 
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states of the other participant who ostensibly took part in this study before, their estimates 
of agency would be based on the same cues, except represented for another person and 
not themselves. Especially when it comes to implicit estimates of agency, these should 
result in similar sense of agency experiences. Importantly, while the cues of priority 
principle modulated perceived agency, consistency was constant. Because the “other” 
agent was implicitly present in a co-action and would be represented from one’s own 
perspective, the principle of exclusivity would not be as powerful in determining the 
sense of agency. 
Remembering the outcomes of intentional actions is especially important for 
humans as primates living in and depending on social groups, engaging in joint actions 
and distributing the fruits of our collective labors (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Sebanz, 
2007). It seems it would be evolutionarily advantageous to remember the outcomes of 
actions of agents, as opposed to accidental occurrences, and that is precisely what we 
find. When actions or thoughts of one’s causality precede the event people’s incidental 
memory for those events is better than when they find out of their ostensible influence 




General discussion and implications 
 
The effects of perceived agency and association with actions on memory 
Voluntary action and associating events with one’s actions improve how well 
information is remembered both in an explicit and implicit learning paradigm. As we’ve 
discussed previously, this theoretically fits with the evolution-inspired idea that agency 
has evolved in order to serve interpersonal coordination. Interestingly, when another 
agent is present, in the first set of studies (1-3) we find that participants experience a 
relative loss of personal control and agency and decreased memory performance. 
However, when another agent is present and serves to establish a causal order in a 
sequence of events, such as in Study 5, participants’ memory is improved.  
With respect to agentic choice based encoding and ensuing memorial boosts, we 
can attempt to explain the effects of increased recall observed in the self choice condition 
with deeper encoding. However, it remains speculative what learning strategies 
participants were employing that were different, and that induced deeper processing 
compared to control conditions. In Studies one through three, the self-choice condition 
required participants to select whether they would like any given item to be on the test. 
Presumably, in order to do this, they would have had to assess whether the item will later 
be easy or difficult to recall. In effect, they were making prospective metacognitive 
judgments and these judgments in turn resulted in improved learning. It was in this 
condition that they also felt a greater sense of control and were more engaged compared 
to the “typical study” baseline. Although these metacognitive judgments were made 
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during the first and only presentation of the material, and could therefore be expected to 
take up cognitive resources, they also resulted in better recall of the material itself.  
The findings on engagement are particularly telling for what might be happening 
in the three conditions in Studies two and three. Both choosing for oneself and following 
the choices of another agent seems to be more engaging than simply “studying” in a 
conventional sense, particularly when the studying is paced by the computer. In both self-
choice and computer-choice, presumably participants are making or registering the 
selection of items that would ostensibly be more likely to come up on the test. Their 
engagement in these conditions is significantly higher (when measured after the test) 
compared to the baseline “study only” condition. The recall performance on the other 
hand is significantly better in the choice condition, but significantly worse in the 
computer choice condition. Thus, in computer choice, participants perform worse when 
another’s choice is imposed, despite being more engaged during the study phase. 
Study 3, which was best designed to detect any effects of performance due to 
counterbalancing of materials and within participant design, found that the effect of 
agency on memory performance was mediated by engagement. In other words, increasing 
agency increased the number of items remembered by inducing greater engagement. 
Additionally, in explaining the improved quality of recall in the choice condition, 
a study of judgments of learning found that when learning judgments are made after a 
delay, they increase retention of information (Kimbal & Metcalfe, 2003). This occurs 
because in order to make a judgment of learning, that is whether information is learned 
well or not, the participant has to attempt to covertly attempt recall in order to make this 
judgment. The benefits of retrieval practice, in turn, are well documented in improving 
 90 
recall, both in psychology laboratories and in the classroom (McDaniel, Roediger & 
McDermott, 2007).  However, students don’t realize the benefits of retrieval practice for 
learning and don’t implement this strategy during independent study as much as would be 
useful for learning outcomes (Karpicke, Butler & Roediger, 2009).  
Likewise, when participants in the self-choice condition make decisions about 
whether they would like to see a particular item on the test, they may be attempting to 
associate the words and represent them together in an attempt to determine how easy they 
will be to recall later. While this judgment is not the same as the retrospective assessment 
of learning made in the study described above, it is possible that even metacognitive 
judgments made concurrently with the learning of the material the first time it is 
encountered will cause better learning and later result in increased memory. One 
interesting future direction of this research would be to establish whether participants 
were aware that this judgment helps encoding. Our hypothesis would be that they would 
believe that making those judgments concurrently with learning would be thought of as 
unhelpful, as it may detract attention away from learning. 
Studies four and five can also be framed in the depth of processing framework 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972). When participants thought that the pairings of names and faces 
had to do with the ratings they had made in the previous section of the task, they may 
have activated their impressions of the particular individuals pictured, thus adding prior 
knowledge to the encoding process and increasing its success and depth.  
However, it isn’t clear why participants would have activated prior knowledge 
when they were told that ratings of another participant would be used. In this case, they 
may have simply wanted to know how well their ratings did or did not match those that 
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another student may have provided about the persons pictured. A possible explanation 
would be that representing one’s own causal actions and those of other people engenders 
the same level of processing. It is worth noting that operationalizing levels of processing 
has largely proceeded by having participants make different kinds of judgments (ex. 
semantic vs. phonetic), often not distinguished further by their level of relevance to the 
individual. It is possible that it is in fact this dimension of relevance (Eitam & Higgins, 
2010) that has the potential to add the continuous nature to the levels of processing 
framework that “depth of processing” was conceptualized to have (Craik, 2002).  
The result that decreased sense of control results in worse memory performance is 
in line with Ryan and Deci’s theory of self-determination (2000), where acting with 
fewer constraints and more perceived autonomy results in better learning outcomes. 
Indeed what this work contributes to that theoretical framework is an attempt at 
understanding the mechanisms of the widely cited effect that intrinsic motivation and 
practices that support it result in better academic outcomes. In fact, when people are 
motivated to engage with the environment themselves and have more autonomy in doing 
so, they might be learning with greater efficacy due to the way that they likely engage 
with the learning material. However, while the connection between these findings seems 
perfectly logical, it still remains to be tested how the macro level variables, such as 
intrinsic motivation, may play out in particular learning strategies and the efficacy of 
learning that then occurs. 
As discussed earlier in the paper, the framework that best explains the current data 
is one of Relevance of Representation (Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Across all studies, we 
control for the salience that comes from the material itself and systematically manipulate 
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how relevant it is to one’s own actions. This kind of manipulation affects how relevant 
the materials become for one of the most basic human motivations, that is to maintain 
control over the environment. Second, if we assume that participants wish to do well, and 
they may wish to do well on the test that they expect to have in Studies 1-3, we are 
enhancing their agency over achieving something of value to them.  
In fact we see that even when participants learn after the fact (but before the recall 
test) that the names and faces were associated ostensibly based on their ratings, their 
recall is improved compared to having seen all the same events in an unrelated sequence 
that has no bearing on any agent. 
 
Self and other distinction 
 Because the two paradigms are different and designed to measure explicit and 
implicit memory respectively, it is not possible to make direct comparisons between the 
roles of the “other” in these settings. Therefore, we cannot place much weight on the 
preceding conclusion about the role of other boosting or impairing memory. However, 
some recent work suggests that the coordination of self and other makes a crucial 
difference in how individuals remember materials assigned to themselves in an agentic 
self-reference paradigm (Miles, Nind, Henderson & Macrae, 2010). Namely, behavioral 
synchrony (in-phase) results in less difference in memory for self compared to other, 
whereas coordination of actions that is not dissimilar to turn taking, called anti-phase 
coordination, results in greater self-other differences.   
Similarly, when the other is in coordinated with the self in such a way that one’s 
choices are precluded when another chooses (Studies 1 through 3), we see decrements in 
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memory performance. However, when the perspective and actions of the individual and 
the other are quite similar, observing the outcomes of one’s actions results in greater 
memory performance compared to no agent (Studies 4 and 5), yet only insignificantly 
less well remembered than one’s own actions.  
It is worth noting that in Chapter 2, while the imposed choices of an implicit other 
did result in a sense of lesser agency and poorer performance overall, the “selected” items 
were better remembered. When an item was “selected” and seemed like it was more 
likely to be on the test, the participants overall recalled it better, just like they did with 
those items they had selected. 
In the preceding studies, particularly four and five, we’ve demonstrated that 
accessibility in memory is not simply about the amount of time or the number or times 
the participant has seen a stimulus appear. The same stimuli are remembered better when 
a person has assumed an agentic mindset, where a stimulus is no longer simply an event, 
but the outcome of one’s actions. This activates the basic motivation for personal control 
(Higgins, 2012) and thus results in greater accessibility of the representation formed. That 
motivation plays an important role in accessibility of memories is precisely the basic 
tenet of ROAR theory - Relevance of a Representation – where the accessibility of 
information is modulated not only by the classic factors that have been studied 
historically (ex. repetition, recency, salience of stimulus), but also by one’s motivational 
state in the pursuit of control, truth and value (Eitam & Higgins, 2010).  
Interestingly, the “actions” of another individual seem to increase the relevance of 
those representations as well and while participants do remember the information better 
when the actions are ostensibly their own, the difference between the self and other is not 
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statistically significant, while both the self and other reference to actions result in better 
recall performance compared to the control condition in which there is no mention of 
action, therefore no causal structure to the experience nor the relevance to an agent.  
A further question arises with regards to the emotions participants experienced as 
a consequence of fairly low performance on the test. Although participants in the action 
priority group and thought priority performed better than all other groups, they felt most 
negative emotion. While this is somewhat ironic, it is in fact what we should expect if we 
explain this finding in terms of motivational engagement. If we assume that a greater 
sense of agency results in greater relevance, the (negative) outcome will be more relevant 
as well and therefore amplify the emotional response. Interestingly, the emotional 
responses did not differ whether the causal agent was presented to be self or other.  
In the framework of relevance of representation (Eitam & Higgins, 2010), this 
finding demonstrates that the memories encoded under conditions of high agency 
relevance have a greater impact on emotional responses, amplifying the value of the 
outcome. We would also hypothesize that if the evaluation of one’s performance were 
positive, it would become amplified and more self-relevant under conditions of higher 
agency.  
We can relate the results obtained for negative emotional responses to the 
interpretation of Milgram’s (1963) famous study of obedience and the ensuing agentic 
shift. Many participants who were in the role of “teacher” assigned electric shocks to the 
ostensible other participant that would have caused serious injury or even death. The 
aspect of this study that is less commonly discussed is that the participants who did this 
felt very distressed after the debriefing and during the study, and this was because they 
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had taken their role seriously by establishing a sense of shared reality with the 
experimenter, and were indeed taking some responsibility for their actions (Higgins, 
2011). If an agentic shift had indeed occurred, the implication is that they would not have 
felt responsible and that they would not have such negative emotional responses to 
having done something so negative. Indeed, if it were possible to conduct this or similar 
experiments again, it would be very interesting to see whether the negative emotions 
experienced by the participants in response to something they had done at the behest and 
with lots of pressure by the experimenter would be as great as when they performed the 
same acts with negative consequences of their own volition or with little pressure. 
 
Future directions and implications 
Perception, cognition and action have long been seen as adapted for living in a 
social group (Fiske, 1992). Psychology researchers have studied the social nature of 
action using a variety of approaches (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). However, the 
relationship between the perception of agency and memory has not been well established 
yet. We have attempted to contribute to this endeavor, but there is still much to be done. 
First, we will address the possible new directions for research on the effects of the 
sense of agency on memory when that sense arises from making choices, even when this 
exercise is illusory (Chapter 2). Second, we will address outstanding questions with 
regards to causal action, and the effects that it has on memory during different phases of 
learning and retention. We’ll also discuss the possible directions in research on self-
relevant actions and other relevant actions (Chapter 3). 
 96 
Given that information associated with one’s choices and actions is remembered 
better, one interesting avenue of research would be to explore whether this kind of 
information is more likely to affect one’s self concept. Active self-concept (Wheeler, 
Demarree & Petty, 2007) is more likely to be malleable and changeable across situations 
although people tend to perceive it as less variable than it is (Swann & Buhrmester, 
2012). Similarly, although it’s clearly conceptually a distinct, choice-induced attitude 
change and the thoroughly studied phenomenon of the free-choice paradigm (Brehm, 
1956) could have one’s sense of perceived control at the core of the mechanism by which 
it occurs. 
One interesting question would lead to an examination of whether the information 
processed when one feels a greater sense of control based in conceptually mediated social 
cues, such as power, would result in greater relevance of that information for the 
inferences that one makes about their current, active self or even their chronic sense of 
self. Perceived voluntary action may give rise to a sense of self that habitually engages in 
actions and produces outcomes over which we feel control and therefore “adopt” them 
into our memory and perhaps our sense of ourselves. It’s important to note here that the 
actions which we perceive as being automatic and involuntary may not enjoy the same 
status as those imbued with the perception of control that seems to be beneficial to 
remembering the products of our actions. The mechanisms that mediate this effect have 
not yet been explored and more interdisciplinary research is needed to address this issue. 
Furthermore, we wish to address potential caveats of the studies presented herein. 
While evaluating whether one would like to see the material on the test resulted in 
learning gains, it was compared to a condition where those decisions were already made 
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by another ostensible agent. These two conditions could therefore differ in depth of 
processing, such that the processing is deeper when making evaluative judgments, which 
could require an evaluation of how difficult the material is. Therefore, it remains to be 
studied how different kinds of evaluative judgments would or would not enhance learning 
and whether choosing for oneself would exhibit learning gains beyond those that may be 
due to making an evaluative judgment related to a prospective assessment of one’s 
knowledge. However, in order to address this potential caveat we can cite evidence from 
Chapter 2, showing that the selected word pairs, for both self-selected and other selected 
conditions, were recalled better in either condition, but the difference was equivalent (i.e. 
there was no interaction). This would suggest that the effect stemmed not only from 
having remembered the selected items better, but from the overall experience of choosing 
or not choosing that this created. 
With regards to the use of choice as a vehicle of agency, it should be noted that 
choice would not be a vehicle of agency in any context. The psychological meaning of 
choice may differ depending on the context: too many choices have been shown to be 
demotivating (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Furthermore, who does the choosing and when 
this produces a sense of agency is culturally specific (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). 
Specifically, the choices of close others in East Asian cultural contexts have the same 
psychological impact on learning as own choice does in the typical cultural context of 
Caucasian USA. Furthermore, choosing can often be motivated by expressing a 
preference, rather than exercising control over the environment, in which case it would 
have different meaning. In the same vein, lacking power in a social context has been 
shown to lead people to seek making choices, as when they get to choose, it repairs their 
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sense of personal control. Conversely, making choices when one is not feeling 
disempowered does not add to the sense of personal control (Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker 
& Galinsky, 2011). Indeed, many of the effects that power has on cognition are mediated 
by an inflated sense of personal control (Fast, et al., 2009).  
Finally, while further investigation of the mechanisms and conditions of these 
effects is warranted, it would also be important to consider the potential of this simple 
and low cost intervention as a tool to enhance student learning. This intervention would 
focus not only on securing conditions for intrinsic motivation, which can be very costly 
and involves an entire upbringing and not merely classroom intervention, but would offer 
simple ways of enhancing student responsibility and engagement. In the studies we 
describe here the sense of control is illusory due to methodological constraints, but in 
naturalistic conditions providing students with their actual choices as well as a sense of 
control may have even more powerful effects. We believe that increasing students’ 
autonomy, even in small ways that can be sustained in classroom management, will 
increase their sense of agency, engagement and learning outcomes. Our research suggests 
that learning that is characterized by a greater degree of engagement and evaluation of 
material during learning in order to choose, may lead to learning gains for the same 
amount of time and effort invested. 
Given that choice is especially relevant to increasing the sense of control when 
one feels a lack of power (Inesi et al., 2011), this kind of intervention is more likely to be 
effective for students who chronically perceive a lack of power in the classroom 
environment. For example, we would hypothesize that those students who have low self-
efficacy as a chronic self-perception (Bandura, 1977) or are vulnerable to experiencing 
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stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995) in the relevant domain of learning might see 
greater learning gains when choice satisfies their need for control. Importantly, choices 
that are easy to make and personally relevant are most likely to enhance personal control, 
while too many options tend to overwhelm people (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), and would 
likely not result in an increased sense of control, creating the opposite experience of low 
control instead. 
With regards to the work presented in Chapter 3, the difference in memory effects 
for self as agent compared to other were not significant, although further replications of 
this effect would make conclusions more reliable due to the possibility that it is a small 
effect and the study was underpowered to detect it.  
Furthermore, investigation is needed to account for variables that pertain to the 
perceived qualities of the aforementioned “other” agent. Are the agent’s actions 
represented in opposition or in synchrony with one’s own perspective? Are they 
perceived as an in-group or out-group member? Are they cooperating or competing, 
similar or dissimilar, warm or cold (Cuddy, Fiske, Glick, 2007)? 
Our suspicion here is that the advantage of self over other related information 
may be quite sensitive to the way that the other is perceived and this would be a worthy 
future direction. Our hypothesis is that in settings where the other person is taking the 
same perspective as the ostensible ”other”, we might find little difference in memory as 
the participants co-represent and thus possibly covertly recall the material, similarly to 
the way that people represent other’s actions in a task (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2005). 
In order to assess the impact of the causal representation of actions, we used self 
and other as agent thus far. A fruitful future direction would be to compare these 
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conditions to ones where a causal structure exists, but the causes are inanimate. This 
would help us tease apart the effects of causal structuring of events per se and its effect 
on memory compared to the presence of an animate agent executing a causal sequence of 
events. 
Finally, surprise recall task may be a less sensitive measure of accessibility than 
other measures that psychology has at its disposal. Future directions should therefore 
include replications using recognition tests and measuring reaction times in tasks such as 
lexical decision tasks (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), which would give us a more fine-
grained picture of the accessibility of constructs, as recognitions tests can tap into implicit 
memory that one is not necessarily conscious of (Tulving, 2002). 
In conclusion, the results presented in this work suggest that a high perceived 
sense of agency increases engagement and thus increases how much information is 
remembered. Furthermore, when the same information is represented as the outcome of 
one’s own or another agent’s causal influence, more of this information remains 
accessible later. We suggest that perceived agency increases motivational relevance of 
information processed in connection with it and therefore leads to increases in how much 
we remember (Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Furthermore, if one’s sense of agency is 
evolutionarily important for coordinating actions with others and eventually developing 
specialized roles increased memory for information related to our own perceived control 
and actions as well as those of relevant others would confer evolutionary benefits to an 
individual who could then coordinate actions with other individuals (ex. Sebanz, 2007). 
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Appendix A. Study 1 word pairs 
Study 1word pairs randomly assigned across four blocks forming the following lists. The 









































































Appendix B. Agency Questionnaire 
 
Agency Questionnaire adapted for Studies 1 through 3.  
1. How much control did you feel over the task? 
2. To what extent did the task feel deliberate? 
3. To what degree did you feel that the task belonged to you? 
4. To what degree did you feel that you were responsible for the task? 
5. To what extent did the task feel voluntary? 
6. To what extent did you feel that you willed the task? 
7. To what degree do you feel the computer program was responsible for the task? 
Engagement measure 
8. How engaged did you feel during this task? 
 
The questions were presented one at a time on a screen and the participants were 






Appendix C. Filler questions 
Filler Questions: 
1. How much did you like the background color in this task? 
2. To what extent did you feel the word pairs were well matched? 
3. To what degree did you like the font in this task? 
4. How much did you like the contrast of the color of font and background? 
5. To what extent did you feel the words were presented for too long? 
6. To what extent did you feel the words were presented too fast? 
7. To what extent did you feel there were too many word- pairs in the task? 
 
The questions were presented one at a time on a screen and the participants were 




Appendix D. Study 2 Word Pairs 



























































































































Appendix E. Study 3 Word Pairs 
The word pairs were twice randomly assigned to lists. Each participant saw six lists in 
one of the two random assignment sets. Each of the lists appeared (for random 
assignment one and two, totaling 12 lists) appeared an equal amount of times for each 
experimental condition, across participants. 
Random assignment one: 
 
cue target 
fable  lesson 
hand  write 
zucchini  cucumber 
laser   red 
cat  kitten 
herb  parsley 
label  bottle 
space  rocket 
apple  peach 
vessel  blood 
land  water 
receipt  cash 
island  stream 
tablet  notes 


















clue  puzzle 
doll  girl 
ledge  mountain 
sculpture  body 
valve  pressure 
crayon  blue 
germ  culture 
lace  gown 
recipe instruction 
hotel  sleep 
ivory  tower 
office  paper 
hem  dress 
panel  truck 
wind  breeze 




















citizen  city 
sandpaper  wood 
bench  table 
curtain  wall 
map  state 
example  instance 
request  question 
unicorn  myth 
canal  ditch 
display  museum 
quiz  grade 
coral  rock 
fence  guard 
whale  dolphin 
tantrum  anger 
  
cue target 
campus  people 
acre  area 
saxophone  tuba 
box  cube 
disorder  hospital 
pill  vitamin 
man  lady 
oasis  mirage 
blender  shape 
cabbage  patch 
daisy  tulip 
glacier  iceberg 
solution  formula 
voyage  sea 
granite  sculpture 







teapot  kitchen 
appliance  iron 
lapel  pin 
knee  elbow 
potato  food 
machine  work 
shampoo  soap 
theorem  algebra 
fiddle  viola 
baker  oven 
nature  hike 
binder  paper 
bird  sing 
dawn  sunset 
meadow  flower 
  cue target 
architect designer 
margin  line 
snob  nose 
drum  guitar 
raccoon  tail 
balcony   theater 
purple  blue 
case  law 
ancestor  age 
silence  peace 
radish  tomato 
parcel  postage 
salt  spice 
chimney  top 
picnic  basket 
gallon  half 
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Random assignment two: 
  cue  target 
acre  area 
baker  oven 
theorem  algebra 
picnic  basket 
cabbage  patch 
canal  ditch 
purple  blue 
clue  puzzle 
glacier  iceberg 
quiz  grade 
sandpaper  wood 
case  law 
crayon  blue 
germ  culture 
pill  vitamin 
saxophone  tuba 
  
cue  target 
recipe  instruction 
raccoon  tail 
request  question 
blender  shape 
hotel  sleep 
receipt  cash 
herb  parsley 
meadow  flower 
bird  sing 
emerald  ruby 
unicorn  myth 
zucchini  cucumber 
label  bottle 
valve  pressure 
laser   red 







cue  target 
quantity  number 
radish  tomato 
parcel  postage 
wind  breeze 
voyage  sea 
fable  lesson 
chimney  top 
office  paper 
binder  paper 
ivory  tower 
granite  sculpture 
panel  truck 
coral  rock 
lapel  pin 
bench  table 
display  museum 
  
cue  target 
vessel  blood 
appliance  iron 
doll  girl 
fence  guard 
island  stream 
land  water 
cat  kitten 
curtain  wall 
fiddle  viola 
campus  people 
lace  gown 
tantrum  anger 
adult  parent 
potato  food 
architect  designer 







cue  target 
man lady 
drum  guitar 
snob  nose 
margin  line 
disorder  hospital 
machine  work 
nature  hike 
atlas  world 
knee  elbow 
smog  dirt 
solution  formula 
dawn  sunset 
whale  dolphin 
sculpture  body 
shampoo  soap 
ancestor  age 
  
cue  target 
hem dress 
oasis  mirage 
teapot  kitchen 
salt  spice 
citizen  city 
silence  peace 
ledge  mountain 
tablet  notes 
Europe  romance 
box  cube 
hand  write 
daisy  tulip 
apple  peach 
balcony   theater 
map  state 
space  rocket 




Appendix. F Face and Name stimuli for Studies 4 and 5 
Stimuli used in Studies 4 and 5 (Faces and names). The following faces were used in the 
trait rating task and were later presented for 3 seconds with the faces that appear below 
each image. In Study 5 only, participants were told that they should  respond by pressing 
a key when they heard a tone which was played 4 times in random intervals during the 
























































Appendix G Self-Causal Article (Future) – SC(F) 
 SC(F) Article used to induce a sense of own causality for the matching of faces 
and names at the beginning of the experiment, before the ratings took place (Self/Action 
Priority condition). The bolded text at the end of the paragraph was bolded when 
presented to participants on the screen and contains the most relevant differences in 
experimental conditions. 
	  
The Character of Names 
 
“The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. The named is the mother of ten 
thousand things.”  
 
Have you ever had a sense that a person’s name fits them perfectly? She really does look 
just like a Tina! He really is a true (insert your example here)! It turns out that a sequence 
of psychological mechanisms do truly connect people’s traits and letters and that 
mysterious impression of correspondence that is sometimes all to clearly exemplified in 
the people we know.  
Names are not randomly assigned to people. They are chosen by parents, 
frequently after prolonged discussions about the meanings of names and the quest for the 
most unique and appropriate one for their child-to-be. Parents choose their children’s 
names based on what they hope for or expect them to become. Choosing a name is surely 
not the only thing that parents do to allow (or coax) their child to live out the hopes and 
dreams they hold for them. For example, if parents hope for their children to be creative, 
they will select an unusual name, preferably with an esoteric meaning, but they will also 
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be more likely to support their child’s autonomy, encourage expression and provide art or 
music lessons for their child. Therefore, the child bearing a creative name will on average 
be more likely to actually be creative than someone with a more typical name (Wallinsky 
& Lowen, 2009).   
Beyond the name associated rearing practices, when you are about to meet a peer 
named Patience Lowenstein, a much different set of associations come to mind than if 
she were to be introduced as Patty Love (Leirer, Hamilton, & Carpenter, 1982). Given 
that a name is often the first thing you learn about a person, your unconscious name-
based associations “leak out” through non-verbal, uncontrollable behaviors. Likewise, the 
name bearer unconsciously responds to those expectations by emphasizing precisely the 
behaviors that would fit them (Rosenthal, 2003). Therefore, the self-fulfilling prophesy of 
Patience becomes more likely. 
In addition, because of a cognitive bias called hypothesis-confirmation, 
information that is in line with one’s expectations stands out among infinite number of 
possible conclusions you could make about the name bearer (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). 
When people reconstruct their memories at the next party, including memories about 
people, based on what is consistent with what they believe or expect about them, the 
behaviors that confirm that initial vague expectation become more memorable (Snyder, 
1984). This theory explains why the next time someone thinks about Patience a week 
later, they will be more likely to remember her serene look after dinner in the beige sofa 
than her eagerness to start eating at the table, making it more likely to conclude that she is 
patient and easy going than not. 
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Therefore, by the time that a name-bearer first gets to reflect on their character 
and form their sense of self, they have had countless interactions with people who expect, 
and later see them according to the traits that fit their names. This does not mean that 
every Patience will always be patient and kind, but that these kinds of interactions and 
psychological mechanisms make it more likely that name-bearers will have the traits 
associated with their names. According to a time-tested theory of self and self-narrative 
(Mead & Morris, 1934), people construct their selves precisely through these interactions. 
In a nutshell, this theory states the self doesn’t exist in a social vacuum, but is shaped 
though countless interactions with others that mirror the views that others hold about the 
name-bearer. 
Implicit in the discussion so far is the assumption that both parents and peers 
associate names with certain meanings and traits. Countless databases list meanings of 
names derived from the origins of names and their associated meanings in the language 
and culture from which they originated. The phonemes (letters and sounds) that go into a 
name and the affect that the pronounced name produces are associated with their 
meaning. In the languages studied so far, English and Spanish, consonants tend to inhabit 
names that reflect strength and seriousness, creative names contain letters that are less 
frequently used in the given language and more vowels are a marker for interpersonal 
warmth.  
 The experiment you are participating in today uses an algorithm found in 
previous studies in order to assign names to the persons rated for their character 
traits. During the experiment, the ratings you provide of people pictured in the 
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photographs and letters will be used to assign the most appropriate names to the 
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Appendix H Self-Causal Article (Past- Future) – SC(PF) 
 
SC(PF) Article used to induce a sense of own causality for the matching of faces and 
names after the ratings took place but before the participants saw the ostensible 
“outcome” of their actions (Self/Thought Priority condition). The bolded text at the end 
of the paragraph was bolded when presented to participants on the screen and contains 
the most relevant differences in experimental conditions. 
 
 
The Character of Names 
 
“The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. The named is the mother of ten 
thousand things.”  
 
Have you ever had a sense that a person’s name fits them perfectly? She really does look 
just like a Tina! He really is a true (insert your example here)! It turns out that a sequence 
of psychological mechanisms do truly connect people’s traits and letters and that 
mysterious impression of correspondence that is sometimes all to clearly exemplified in 
the people we know.  
Names are not randomly assigned to people. They are chosen by parents, 
frequently after prolonged discussions about the meanings of names and the quest for the 
most unique and appropriate one for their child-to-be. Parents choose their children’s 
names based on what they hope for or expect them to become. Choosing a name is surely 
not the only thing that parents do to allow (or coax) their child to live out the hopes and 
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dreams they hold for them. For example, if parents hope for their children to be creative, 
they will select an unusual name, preferably with an esoteric meaning, but they will also 
be more likely to support their child’s autonomy, encourage expression and provide art or 
music lessons for their child. Therefore, the child bearing a creative name will on average 
be more likely to actually be creative than someone with a more typical name (Wallinsky 
& Lowen, 2009).   
Beyond the name associated rearing practices, when you are about to meet a peer 
named Patience Lowenstein, a much different set of associations come to mind than if 
she were to be introduced as Patty Love (Leirer, Hamilton, & Carpenter, 1982). Given 
that a name is often the first thing you learn about a person, your unconscious name-
based associations “leak out” through non-verbal, uncontrollable behaviors. Likewise, the 
name bearer unconsciously responds to those expectations by emphasizing precisely the 
behaviors that would fit them (Rosenthal, 2003). Therefore, the self-fulfilling prophesy of 
Patience becomes more likely. 
In addition, because of a cognitive bias called hypothesis-confirmation, 
information that is in line with one’s expectations stands out among infinite number of 
possible conclusions you could make about the name bearer (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). 
When people reconstruct their memories at the next party, including memories about 
people, based on what is consistent with what they believe or expect about them, the 
behaviors that confirm that initial vague expectation become more memorable (Snyder, 
1984). This theory explains why the next time someone thinks about Patience a week 
later, they will be more likely to remember her serene look after dinner in the beige sofa 
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than her eagerness to start eating at the table, making it more likely to conclude that she is 
patient and easy going than not. 
Therefore, by the time that a name-bearer first gets to reflect on their character 
and form their sense of self, they have had countless interactions with people who expect, 
and later see them according to the traits that fit their names. This does not mean that 
every Patience will always be patient and kind, but that these kinds of interactions and 
psychological mechanisms make it more likely that name-bearers will have the traits 
associated with their names. According to a time-tested theory of self and self-narrative 
(Mead & Morris, 1934), people construct their selves precisely through these interactions. 
In a nutshell, this theory states the self doesn’t exist in a social vacuum, but is shaped 
though countless interactions with others that mirror the views that others hold about the 
name-bearer. 
Implicit in the discussion so far is the assumption that both parents and peers 
associate names with certain meanings and traits. Countless databases list meanings of 
names derived from the origins of names and their associated meanings in the language 
and culture from which they originated. The phonemes (letters and sounds) that go into a 
name and the affect that the pronounced name produces are associated with their 
meaning. In the languages studied so far, English and Spanish, consonants tend to inhabit 
names that reflect strength and seriousness, creative names contain letters that are less 
frequently used in the given language and more vowels are a marker for interpersonal 
warmth.   
The experiment you are participating in today uses an algorithm found in 
previous studies in order to assign names to the persons rated for their character 
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traits. In this experiment, the ratings you provided of people pictured in the 
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Appendix I Self Causal Article (Past) 
 
SC(P) Article used to induce a sense of own causality for the matching of faces and 
names, but only after the participant had already completed both the ostensible action and 
outcome phases of the experiment (No Priority Self condition). The bolded text at the end 
of the paragraph was bolded when presented to participants on the screen and contains 




The Character of Names 
 
“The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. The named is the mother of ten 
thousand things.”  
 
Have you ever had a sense that a person’s name fits them perfectly? She really does look 
just like a Tina! He really is a true (insert your example here)! It turns out that a sequence 
of psychological mechanisms do truly connect people’s traits and letters and that 
mysterious impression of correspondence that is sometimes all to clearly exemplified in 
the people we know.  
Names are not randomly assigned to people. They are chosen by parents, frequently after 
prolonged discussions about the meanings of names and the quest for the most unique 
and appropriate one for their child-to-be. Parents choose their children’s names based on 
what they hope for or expect them to become. Choosing a name is surely not the only 
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thing that parents do to allow (or coax) their child to live out the hopes and dreams they 
hold for them. For example, if parents hope for their children to be creative, they will 
select an unusual name, preferably with an esoteric meaning, but they will also be more 
likely to support their child’s autonomy, encourage expression and provide art or music 
lessons for their child. Therefore, the child bearing a creative name will on average be 
more likely to actually be creative than someone with a more typical name (Wallinsky & 
Lowen, 2009).   
Beyond the name associated rearing practices, when you are about to meet a peer named 
Patience Lowenstein, a much different set of associations come to mind than if she were 
to be introduced as Patty Love (Leirer, Hamilton, & Carpenter, 1982). Given that a name 
is often the first thing you learn about a person, your unconscious name-based 
associations “leak out” through non-verbal, uncontrollable behaviors. Likewise, the name 
bearer unconsciously responds to those expectations by emphasizing precisely the 
behaviors that would fit them (Rosenthal, 2003). Therefore, the self-fulfilling prophesy of 
Patience becomes more likely. 
In addition, because of a cognitive bias called hypothesis-confirmation, information that 
is in line with one’s expectations stands out among infinite number of possible 
conclusions you could make about the name bearer (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). When 
people reconstruct their memories at the next party, including memories about people, 
based on what is consistent with what they believe or expect about them, the behaviors 
that confirm that initial vague expectation become more memorable (Snyder, 1984). This 
theory explains why the next time someone thinks about Patience a week later, they will 
be more likely to remember her serene look after dinner in the beige sofa than her 
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eagerness to start eating at the table, making it more likely to conclude that she is patient 
and easy going than not. 
Therefore, by the time that a name-bearer first gets to reflect on their character and form 
their sense of self, they have had countless interactions with people who expect, and later 
see them according to the traits that fit their names. This does not mean that every 
Patience will always be patient and kind, but that these kinds of interactions and 
psychological mechanisms make it more likely that name-bearers will have the traits 
associated with their names. According to a time-tested theory of self and self-narrative 
(Mead & Morris, 1934), people construct their selves precisely through these interactions. 
In a nutshell, this theory states the self doesn’t exist in a social vacuum, but is shaped 
though countless interactions with others that mirror the views that others hold about the 
name-bearer. 
Implicit in the discussion so far is the assumption that both parents and peers associate 
names with certain meanings and traits. Countless databases list meanings of names 
derived from the origins of names and their associated meanings in the language and 
culture from which they originated. The phonemes (letters and sounds) that go into a 
name and the affect that the pronounced name produces are associated with their 
meaning. In the languages studied so far, English and Spanish, consonants tend to inhabit 
names that reflect strength and seriousness, creative names contain letters that are less 
frequently used in the given language and more vowels are a marker for interpersonal 
warmth.   
The experiment you are participating in today uses an algorithm found in previous 
studies in order to assign names to the persons rated for their character traits. In 
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this experiment, the ratings you provided of people pictured in the photographs and 
letters were used to assign the most appropriate names to the persons.  
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Appendix J Other Causal Article 
 
Other Causal (OC) The following article was used to induce the sense causal structure of 
events for the ostensible outcome of matching of faces and names, that was ostensibly 
due to ratings provided by another student who previously participated in the study. This 
article was used in conditions: Other/ActionPriority, Other/Thought Priority, 
Other/NoPriority. The bolded text at the end of the paragraph was bolded when presented 
to participants on the screen and contains the most relevant differences in experimental 
conditions. 
 
The Character of Names 
 
“The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. The named is the mother of ten 
thousand things.”  
 
Have you ever had a sense that a person’s name fits them perfectly? She really does look 
just like a Tina! He really is a true (insert your example here)! It turns out that a sequence 
of psychological mechanisms does truly connect people’s traits and letters and that 
mysterious impression of correspondence that is sometimes all to clearly exemplified in 
the people we know.  
Names are not randomly assigned to people. They are chosen by parents, frequently after 
prolonged discussions about the meanings of names and the quest for the most unique 
and appropriate one for their child-to-be. Parents choose their children’s names based on 
what they hope for or expect them to become. Choosing a name is surely not the only 
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thing that parents do to allow (or coax) their child to live out the hopes and dreams they 
hold for them. For example, if parents hope for their children to be creative, they will 
select an unusual name, preferably with an esoteric meaning, but they will also be more 
likely to support their child’s autonomy, encourage expression and provide art or music 
lessons for their child. Therefore, the child bearing a creative name will on average be 
more likely to actually be creative than someone with a more typical name (Wallinsky & 
Lowen, 2009).   
Beyond the name associated rearing practices, when you are about to meet a peer named 
Patience Lowenstein, a much different set of associations come to mind than if she were 
to be introduced as Patty Love (Leirer, Hamilton, & Carpenter, 1982). Given that a name 
is often the first thing you learn about a person, your unconscious name-based 
associations “leak out” through non-verbal, uncontrollable behaviors. Likewise, the name 
bearer unconsciously responds to those expectations by emphasizing precisely the 
behaviors that would fit them (Rosenthal, 2003). Therefore, the self-fulfilling prophesy of 
Patience becomes more likely. 
In addition, because of a cognitive bias called hypothesis-confirmation, information that 
is in line with one’s expectations stands out among infinite number of possible 
conclusions you could make about the name bearer (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). When 
people reconstruct their memories at the next party, including memories about people, 
based on what is consistent with what they believe or expect about them, the behaviors 
that confirm that initial vague expectation become more memorable (Snyder, 1984). This 
theory explains why the next time someone thinks about Patience a week later, they will 
be more likely to remember her serene look after dinner in the beige sofa than her 
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eagerness to start eating at the table, making it more likely to conclude that she is patient 
and easy going than not. 
Therefore, by the time that a name-bearer first gets to reflect on their character and form 
their sense of self, they have had countless interactions with people who expect, and later 
see them according to the traits that fit their names. This does not mean that every 
Patience will always be patient and kind, but that these kinds of interactions and 
psychological mechanisms make it more likely that name-bearers will have the traits 
associated with their names. According to a time-tested theory of self and self-narrative 
(Mead & Morris, 1934), people construct their selves precisely through these interactions. 
In a nutshell, this theory states the self doesn’t exist in a social vacuum, but is shaped 
though countless interactions with others that mirror the views that others hold about the 
name-bearer. 
Implicit in the discussion so far is the assumption that both parents and peers associate 
names with certain meanings and traits. Countless databases list meanings of names 
derived from the origins of names and their associated meanings in the language and 
culture from which they originated. The phonemes (letters and sounds) that go into a 
name and the affect that the pronounced name produces are associated with their 
meaning. In the languages studied so far, English and Spanish, consonants tend to inhabit 
names that reflect strength and seriousness, creative names contain letters that are less 
frequently used in the given language and more vowels are a marker for interpersonal 
warmth.   
The experiment you are participating in today uses an algorithm found in previous 
studies in order to assign names to the persons rated for their character traits. The 
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relevant ratings of people pictured in the photographs and letters were provided by 
another student. 
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Appendix K Names Article 
 
Names. The following article was used as control reading material, which talks about 
names but does not mention any kind of connection between the ostensible actions (rating 
faces on traits and ranking letters for trait associations) and ostensible outcomes (the 
pairing of faces and names). 
 
 
The Weird World of L.L.C. Names 
 
By ELIZABETH A. HARRIS 
 
WHEN you see the words “Bubble & Squeak,” what do you think of? A child’s toy? 
Bathroom cleanser? Or does the traditional English dish of fried leftovers like potatoes 
and cabbage come to mind? 
How about property in Chelsea? That is correct, because in addition to the dish, Bubble 
& Squeak is the name of a small company that owns real estate. 
“We started off with a loft building, and the building itself was a bit of a fried-up 
leftover,” said John Dulfer, one of the owners of Bubble & Squeak L.L.C. “It seemed to 
fit quite well.” 
Mr. Dulfer has since moved on to a brownstone in Chelsea, which is in much better 
condition, he said. But the name stuck. 
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“Most people don’t know what it is,” said Lori Feiler, a broker at Halstead Property who 
helps Mr. Dulfer find rental tenants. “They say, ‘What is that referring to? Does it have 
something to do with a bath?’ ” 
Dov Treiman, a real estate lawyer, said the L.L.C., which stands for limited liability 
company, first appeared in New York State in the mid-1990s. They have been used in 
real estate transactions for a number of reasons, including liability protection. 
But they can also serve to shield one’s identity, which has made them popular among 
celebrities. Deeds are a matter of public record, and if the name “Angelina Jolie” pops up 
on a condominium transaction, someone is going to notice. If she buys under an L.L.C. 
named, say, “37 Niños,” perhaps not. 
“We absolutely advise people who want their identity confidential to buy in an L.L.C.,” 
said Shaun Osher, the chief executive of CORE Marketing Group, a real estate brokerage 
firm. “Most of the time, the L.L.C. name has some kind of a significance. Usually it’s 
personal, but it has some meaning.” 
So who might have sold a building in Brooklyn under the name “Shabbos Goy L.L.C.”? 
(A shabbos goy is non-Jewish person who helps out on the Sabbath by doing things that 
are forbidden to Jews.) And what might “The Donkey Brothers L.L.C.” signify? That 
possibly left-leaning company sold a condominium in Midtown Manhattan this spring. 
A recent perusal of deeds in Manhattan and Brooklyn revealed a number of other gems, 
including “the Worm In The Big Apple” and “Hot Potato.” Some names are sweet, like 
“Song For My Father,” or “Rabbit Properties.” Others are a little aggressive, like 
“Control The L.L.C.” 
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Pop quiz! What do these names have in common: “Elroy L.L.C.,” “Astro L.L.C.,” and 
“Judy L.L.C.”? 
The answer: “Meet George Jetson ...” 
The firm behind those L.L.C.’s, which own buildings in the tristate area, is Cogswell 
Realty L.L.C., a commercial and residential real estate company named for Cogswell’s 
Cosmic Cogs, a competitor of George Jetson’s employer, Spacely Space Sprockets. 
According to Arthur Stern, the chief executive of Cogswell Realty, the name did not 
come from a fanatical devotion to “The Jetsons,” but from a sense of fun. 
“There was a competitive environment in ‘The Jetsons’ between Spacely Sprockets and 
Cogswell, and Cogswell was always on the victorious side,” Mr. Stern said. “There was 
one particular episode where they got into a zoning dispute, and it turned out that Spacely 
misread a zoning map. That was when we knew.” 
 
 
Quick Arriving Fads Quick to Flame Out 
 
By BILL MARSH and ALICIA DeSANTIS 
 
Poor Amy and Zachary. So popular. And then so ... not popular. Their well-meaning 
parents chose much-liked names that, sadly, were destined to lose their appeal. Why? 
Much has been written about how fads emerge. A new study by the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and Stanford University looks at how quickly American 
culture gains and loses its taste for things and why the two may be related. The starkest 
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example, based on 120 years of census data, is baby names: The faster they come to 
prominence, the faster their use declines. 
Researchers believe swift boom-and-bust cycles affect other cultural trends — fashion, 
music, social movements — suggesting which will be quickly abandoned en masse. So 
enjoy the limelight while you have it, Addison and Aiden. Just ask Mildred. 
 
 
Few Baby Baracks, but Emmas Abound 
 
By SAM ROBERTS 
 
More than four million babies were born in the United States last year, and if any of them 
were named Barack, there were not enough to make the annual ranking of the 1,000 most 
popular baby names. 
But the president’s daughters fared better. While Sasha ranked 363rd among girls, about 
the same as the past few years, Malia leapt to 345, from 400 the year before. (Michelle, 
meanwhile, ranked 103rd, down from 94th in 2007.) 
Over all, according to the list released Wednesday by the Social Security Administration, 
Emma bumped Emily to rank at the top among girls for the first time (although it has 
ranked in single digits since 2002, as it also did in the late 19th century; the rankings date 
to 1880). 
Jacob was No. 1 among boys, as it has been since displacing Michael in 1998. Jacob was 
also the only name to be given to 1 percent or more of the babies born in 2008. 
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The rankings are often influenced by the popularity of celebrities. 
Hillary (as in Clinton) jumped to 715 during last year’s presidential campaign from 961 
in 2007. Jayden, which was No. 75 only five years ago, was 11 last year, thanks, in part, 
to Britney Spears, who chose the name for her son born in 2006. 
Aldo recorded the greatest drop among boys’ names, but that was before Brad Pitt played 
Aldo Raine in the new Quentin Tarantino movie, “Inglourious Basterds.” 
Among twins, the most popular names were Jacob and Joshua for boys and Gabriella and 
Isabella for girls. 
The rankings varied by state. 
In Texas, Jose was first among all newborn boys, but nationwide a number of Hispanic 
names (including Angel, Jesus, Jose, Juan and Luis) all declined slightly in popularity, 
reflecting, perhaps, a greater effort at assimilation. 
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Appendix M Agency Questionnaire adapted for Studies 4 and 5 
 
Ag Q 
1) How much control did you feel over matching the names to faces? 
2) To what extent did the task feel deliberate? 
3) To what degree did you feel that the task belonged to you? 
 4) To what degree did you feel that you were responsible for the matching of name and 
face?       
5) To what extent did the task feel voluntary? 
6) To what extent did you feel that you willed the match between names and faces? 
7) To what degree do you feel the computer was responsible for the name matching? 
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This scale consists of a number of words that describe different emotions. Read each item 
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what 
extent you feel that way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale 
to record your answers. 
 
1 – very slightly or not at all 
2 – a little 
3 – moderately 
4 – quite a bit 
5 – extremely 
 
____ interested 
____ distressed 
____ excited 
____ upset 
____ strong 
____ guilty 
____ scared 
____ hostile 
____ enthusiastic 
____ proud 
____ irritable 
____ alert 
____ ashamed 
____ inspired 
____ nervous 
____ determined 
____ attentive 
____ jittery 
____ active 
____ afraid 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
